My Heart Sutra
This ball is going, going, gone.
Gone beyond the field,
Gone beyond.
Gone.
Beyond the field,
The game is over.
The player is going,
Everybody go.
Start anew.
This ball is going, going, gone.
Gone beyond the field,
Gone beyond.
Gone.
Beyond the field,
The game is over.
The player is going,
Everybody go.
Start anew.
The purpose of this work is not to critique the theories. It is also not an endeavor to bridge or find “common ground” between the “great divide.” Many Eastern and Western philosophies contradict most of the stereotypes, and many comparative philosophers have worked diligently to show such contradictions.[1] Eastern and Western philosophical views occupy the entire spectrum from the Abhidhārma school that focuses on describing all of the causal connections of reality (the objects of reality) and Kong Zi’s position of “formal” virtues and ethics, to Nietzsche’s and Derrida’s destructions and rejections of any possibility of a conceptual description of reality. Therefore, this is an analysis of philosophical methods, specifically in relation to the unifying effort of a global philosophy and not of the findings or theories that are accepted or discovered thereby.
The idea of global philosophy was initiated mainly by professors of the University of Hawaii
This project is worth pursuing for three major reasons. The most obvious motivation is the current state of the world. It has been thrown into an age where every nook and cranny of the world can find out about each other, yet the information shared is the most superficial and partial in nature.[4] This creates many problems, the most prevalent being misunderstandings predicated on ignorance that causes the world’s “evil-doers” to act (select your evil-doer of choice as an example).
We lack genuine understanding of the other and of ourselves. Living amongst the “others” has become living with the “YouTube” version of others. This, in turn, not only limits the full awareness of what it is to live in the world with others but also limits the personal growth that requires a clear understanding of others. Preparing a global philosophy that focuses on a full understanding of the world is worth pursuing. Secondly, the project of global philosophy is currently “on-the-way” with various factions and methods that will be discussed in detail in this paper. Some eerie phenomena are showing their ugly heads. The contribution by Stepukonis along with my additional input will present multiple problems like the “mine is better than yours” syndrome that plagues many fields of study. Moreover, the rephrasing and restructuring of some philosophies have occurred to accommodate the current world-dominating dogmas. These are just some examples that will be covered as pitfalls to a sustainable global philosophy.[5]
Lastly, the original vision of global philosophy can potentially influence humanity in the most beneficial of ways. Philosophy, as it is known in the Anglo-American way of thinking, is also in peril. Solomon states that for the most part, this is due to constant sundering and systemizing that is common practice in “Western” philosophy:
The dominant paradigm of Anglo-American philosophy—which has now been declared ‘dead’ many times—continues to get more emaciated and more exclusive. Meanwhile, the global nature of intellectual life demands that philosophy accommodate a great many ways of thinking that have not been taken seriously or given a place within the American Philosophical Association.[6]
However, the vision and intention of the global movement in its current development seems to be losing ground and plausibility. Due to its potential impact, it is my intention to attempt to uphold the original vision of global philosophy by restructuring its method. One major contribution of this paper is to show the various pitfalls that the initial stages of a global philosophy—the method—can fall into and under what conditions the method of global philosophy can insure the sustainability of the overall project of global philosophy.
After some conditions of sustainability are established, the second section will present an expansive definition of “deconstruction” by stating Derrida’s version of deconstruction and comparing it to the form of deconstruction that is being attributed to some Asian traditions. The result of the second section will demonstrate an extended definition of “deconstruction” that will be better equipped to deal with global issues and global philosophy. The last section will demonstrate the relationship between deconstruction and global philosophy and how the proposed method of deconstruction satisfies the conditions posed above; therefore, this method can be established as the propaedeutic stage of a possible global philosophy.
Chapter 2
The term “global” has been an extremely popular word to denote the fact that we are more connected to all the regions of the world, thereby having a sense of a whole community. Technological advances in many fields have allowed our past region-based thinking to evolve into a more world-based thinking. The term “global” is used to connote this type of world-based thinking that allows one to include other regions into one’s own views. Stepukonis traces the development of global thinking and states that “we witness a series of transitions from the idea of a unified world, which used to fill the imagination of many a thinker with wonder and admiration in past times, to the practical reality [and accessibility] of a unified world.”[7] To think “globally” is to think in a broader, world perspective. In global commerce, business practices have the entire scope of world affairs in mind when making decisions. A global culture also develops its conceptual and practical practices with the unified world in mind. Global philosophy follows a similar mindset. Yet, the popular usage of the term “global philosophy” is still not well-established.[8] The term “world philosophy” seems to be a more popular term.
If the term “global” signifies a world perspective, why not use the term “world” instead? Although some philosophers do use the term “world philosophy” to signify the same thing as “global philosophy,”[9] there is a slight distinction between the two terms that may confuse a reader. While the intention of “global philosophy” is to unite world philosophies, the term “world philosophy” usually refers to a broad scope of multiple philosophical stances, theories, and personages. Some people approach world philosophy as they would world music, world religions, or world history.[10] In such a connotation, global philosophy and world philosophy are quite distinct. Although “world philosophy” can be used to denote the same idea, the fact that it is also used in this other manner can be confusing. Therefore, “global philosophy” is preferred here over “world philosophy.”
Although there seem to be no major controversies over the meaning of “global” thinking, there are various views on how one should practically apply global thinking. For example, in global commerce, whether to think regionally/locally and act globally or vice-versa is still an issue being discussed.[11] In global culture, some want to integrate various cultures into their world-view; others want to make sure the world-view includes their regional qualities. Global philosophy is not excluded from this discussion. In fact, the progress that may be accomplished in this type of philosophical thinking depends on various consolidation methods to facilitate thinking in a worldly, unified manner. Before looking at the various methods and developments, a brief background of the original intention of a global philosophy will be presented.
As the two World Wars separated embattled factions over ideological platforms, they also shed significant light on the ideologies of others and forced the entire world to take the multiplicity of worldviews much more seriously.[12] Since then, there have been attempts at comparative dialogues to shed light on various worldviews. Since the 1940s, the comparative movement of the University of Hawaii Hawaii Moore
Possible Methods of Uniting and Current Developments
Stepukonis undertook an in-depth study of the findings of the above mentioned second East-West Philosophical Conference. He found that the papers and discussions included in the conference developed at least three methods of philosophical “fusion,”[16]: syncretic, comparative, and cosmopolitan. Though these categorizations are not definitive in any way and are only one philosopher’s way of categorizing, some philosophical contributions into the global philosophical discussion seem to fit these categories. They are beneficial in that they allow one to notice the subtle differences in ways of integrating diverse philosophies into one holistic system. Although some gray areas should and must exist where such categories are not as easily recognizable, for the sake of providing concrete examples, Stepukonis’ categorization will be presented. The following is a brief exposition of his findings. My contribution to his project is to provide some additional problems and current efforts or movements that fall into these respective categories.
Syncretic Method
In a syncretic method of uniting the world, the goal is to synthesize the common grounds amongst many philosophies to universalize certain truths.[17] Though the intention to unite is commendable, this method has many problems, which Stepukonis highlights. The first problem is the improbability of lumping or reconciling distinct philosophical platforms.[18] For example, it is difficult, if not highly improbable, to lump all forms of French philosophy together and find common or general concepts.[19] So an attempt to lump Anglo/American philosophy and Asian philosophies together, for example, seems impossible. A syncretic method only attempts to extract the similarities which “will often be made possible only by compromising the authenticity of traditional ways of thinking.”[20] Extracting the similarities among various philosophies also destroys their integrity. When one only extracts certain principles from an entire work, it seems as if the philosophy is losing the rest of the contents.
A second problem that seems to occur is that instead of creating independent thinking, syncretism “gradually evolves into a collective plan of action.” Stepukonis asserts that a practical course of action, even if it is intended as a noble cause, should not be undertaken while the method of synthesizing is still in its early stage.[21] One can argue that the practical goal should be the main motivation of a global philosophy. However, the problem of a practical application is not a matter of the benefit it can provide but rather of the timing of the effort. An example might clarify the distinction; let’s say I decide to attack a country to protect my country from the threat of nuclear weapons. One can see how this intention might be construed as honorable and worthwhile. However, should I not first be certain that I have a solid platform of funding, support, and verification that the country being targeted does in fact have nuclear weapons? Practical actions should be postponed until our methodological platform has been identified as credible and sustainable. Therefore, the second obstacle deals with the pre-supposition that the proposed method of integration has already gone through the philosophical and global “gauntlet” and is seen as viable. Stepukonis would rather see other organizations (like the United Nations) work on the practical issues.[22]
The last problem with syncretism that Stepukonis addresses concerns authority and stability: If a group of people tries to syncretize its philosophical views, who is in charge of keeping or rejecting certain contents? Even if that problem has been resolved, there are still problems with the fact that philosophy, like science, is an ongoing process that is always changing.
One can argue that one of philosophy’s best qualities, like science, is that it is dynamic and ever changing. If one would create a global philosophy, that dynamic quality makes it more sustainable because it is able to survive the transitions of change and the dynamic character of humanity. However, if global philosophy’s intention is to adopt to change and not to endure through change, then why have a global philosophy if philosophy, as it is currently practice, already fulfills that intention? A sustainable global philosophy distinguishes itself from regular philosophy because it attempts to endure and to deal with the dynamic nature of humanity and the world, not change according to the world’s alterations.
I would like to add two more issues related to the problem of authority. The eerie “Mine is better than yours” syndrome rears its ugly head in any effort of synthesis. Various multi-regional camps are forming, attempting to synthesize their platforms to claim that “the content or results of our synthesis is the best for the world.” Satis Chatterjee states:
In the field of metaphysics we find in both the East and the West a number of rival systems, each of which competes with the rest for supremacy. Philosophers, all over the world, are found to hold different views with regards to the nature and number of ultimate realities and are divided into hostile camps.[23]
This highlights another problem of authority. The rephrasing and restructuring of some philosophies to accommodate the current world-dominating dogma can potentially occur. This could happen when the survival or longevity of a region-centric philosophy feels threatened or when it can benefit from an alliance with the current world-dominating dogma. The classic scenario of “If you can’t beat them, join them” for the survival and longevity of a view occurs. Current world-dominating dogmas or the dogmas of the world “powers” are temporary. If we look at the current world-dominating dogmas—the “American Way ,” for example—it is, on its own merits, slowly decaying from the inside out (just turn on the TV for adequate justification).[24] Eventually, every dogmatic “empire” ceases to be. Therefore, an attempt to synthesize the more “popular” philosophical views might be problematic. The distinction between the “Mine is better than yours” syndrome and the “If you can’t beat them, join them” impulse depends on whether one feels that the philosophical stance one champions is strong enough to compete in a global atmosphere. In the case of the “Mine is better than yours” syndrome, that individual or group of individuals feels quite justified in believing that their philosophical theory or system can muster the dynamics of a global atmosphere. On the other hand, the “If you can’t beat them, join them” impulse is determined when an individual or group of individuals acknowledges that their philosophical position can only survive in a global atmosphere as an integration of a stronger more dominating philosophical position. Both of these additional cases of authority are not sound ways to prepare a global philosophy, due to either their rash arrogance or their appeal to a temporary authority. These are some of the problems that a syncretic method of integration faces. For these reasons, I share Stepukonis’ view that a syncretic method of global philosophy is untenable.
An early example of such a synthesis is found in the work by Oliver L. Reiser.[25] Reiser claims that the “salvation (survival) of man’s civilization depends upon attaining the highest level of integration—the level of a scientific synthesis carried forward by socially intelligent educational systems the world over.”[26] By “scientific synthesis” he means the merging of science and philosophical conceptual thinking as the best method of a global (world) philosophy. Reiser’s methodological endeavor starts with “the formal foundations of science,” including logic, the scientific method and epistemology, and progress through the social and physical sciences resulting in a practical philosophical application.[27] This type of synthesis is problematic because it separates the work of metaphysics from philosophy. Furthermore, the end result of the proposed method concludes with a practical application. The practical application is worthwhile but not in the introductory phase of developing a method for integration.
A more recent example of synthesis is Skolimowski’s attempt to provide a platform for global philosophy. He argues that global philosophy is about “the discovery and maintenance of those deep structures which make life one of dignity and joy and which make peace a necessary result of the harmony of human existence.”[28] He is claiming that humanity has a set of “deep structures” common to all, namely freedom, dignity, joy, peace and wholeness.[29] He also states that the basic “modus operandi of Nature, of Evolution, of human societies is symbiosis, give-and-take, reciprocity [and] seeing the unity of it all.”[30] Because our fundamental “sameness” is the desire for peace, the foundation and method for achieving global philosophy is peace. He states that a global philosophy must be “morally oriented (not morally desensitized), one that is rooted in compassion and which accepts empathy as a principle of understanding.”[31] With these commonalities and his methodology in place, he then concludes that:
Peace necessitates and entails social justice in action.
Social justice cannot be secured unless we have right ethics in action.
Right ethics conception of man is the result of upholding a right conception of the Cosmos, within which cooperation and compassion prevail.
Thus understanding peace and building it is tantamount to upholding a right philosophy—not only in thought but in practice, as a part of living reality.[32]
As ideal as this conclusion may be, there are problems with assuming that we share deep structures of freedom, dignity, joy, peace and wholeness and that our method of globalizing philosophy has to have ethical or practical underpinnings. Skilomowski’s assertion that his proposal is supreme also faces obstacles. Hence Skilomowski’s method of synthesis is also untenable.
One current development of synthesis is the attempt by Joseph Grange (John Dewey, Confucius, and Global Philosophy) to delve into the meanings of the cultures of China and the US Ames
Ultimately, Grange’s goal and motivation are to prepare an adequate ethics that can deal better with the problems that arise in a world where meaning and culture are so disconnected.[38] He suggests that the combined efforts of Dewey’s pragmatism and Kong Zi’s ethics can develop a “new dao of feeling our way into and through this impasse in our experience […] Dewey gives us the tool of experimentation; Confucius hands us the instrument of ren.” Though Grange’s intentions are sincere and honorable, his suggestion of preparing an adequate ethic—a practical application—needs to be postponed until a solid global philosophical foundation is prepared. Furthermore, one needs to be careful in one’s efforts to synthesize and claim that the resulting synthesis “is the one.” Though it is not literally noted, an implication of the superiority of the synthesis can be inferred from his conclusion. Grange’s suggestions also have the “taste” of “If you can’t beat them join them” sentiment. Grange does not provide a definite position in terms of asserting superiority nor admitting to “ally with a stronger ideology.” However, one can envision that obstacles of authority can arise within his platform. Grange’s attempt at syncretism is a current development that needs to be avoided due to the potential and definite obstacles that were described above.
Before discussing Stepukonis’ exposition of the method of comparative philosophy, one additional case needs attention. Bahm’s contribution to the comparative effort provides a glimpse into some issues addressed in Stepukonis’ definition of comparative philosophy. Firstly, it seems that Bahm’s comparative philosophy did not intend to be a method to integrate philosophies of the world into a unifying global philosophy. Secondly, Bahm’s seems to use the term “comparative” as synonymous with “syncretic” and/or “cosmopolitan.” A brief evaluation of Bahm’s “comparative philosophy” will adumbrate possible problems ahead for Stepukonis’ definition of the comparative method of global philosophy.
Bahm’s “comparative philosophy” involves “as a minimum, comparisons of views from all the major civilization of the world and, as a maximum, that is, as an ideal, comparisons of all views from all civilizations.”[39] Bahm admits that the range of such an effort is “magnitudinous” but that allows for plenty of work in the future.[40] He believed that in the near future (perhaps now), the emergence of what he calls “world culture” would greatly benefit the comparative endeavor because it would gauge “comparative” contributions in relation to the “suitability to participate” within the world culture.[41] He provides some standards or methods to optimize or to hinder the comparative effort.[42] If and when a world culture does develop, “it can be used as a basis and standard for judging the [comparative] contributions by the various civilizations to it.”[43]
Bahm’s comparative definition does not seem to be geared towards a global philosophy but rather is a comparison using one’s own civilization or region-centric prejudices as the base. Bahm treats comparative philosophy as a “field” or a discipline of study within the philosophical platform,[44] not an attempt to establish a global philosophy. He does mention that he anticipates a “world culture,” but he doesn’t seem to indicate that his comparative philosophy plays a role in that world culture. In a more recent article, Bahm presented his proposal for a global (world) philosophy[45] suggesting that a “world philosophy incorporating contributions from all of the sciences is needed.”[46] Bahm thinks this is possible through an agency that will examine all the philosophical theories and conclusions in the world, determining the value of their inclusion to the world philosophical paradigm.[47] He proposes several factors that will determine induction into a world philosophy “hall of fame” and suggests agencies that are capable of such an undertaking.[48] This later development by Bahm does not mention comparative philosophy at all. So can comparative philosophy integrate the philosophies of the world into a global philosophy? Bahm does not seem to indicate that comparative philosophy can establish a global philosophy. Perhaps, he noticed that as a tool to invite dialogue, it also has its limitations and problems. Bahm does admit that “A primary problem for whoever undertakes this [comparative] project is how to prevent special interests from biasing the general aims of philosophy.”[49] His version of comparative philosophy faces obstacle three (c). The question raised by analyzing Bahm’s version of comparative philosophy is Can comparative philosophy be used as a method to integrate philosophies of the world into a global philosophy?
The second issue that Bahm’s exposition elucidates is the tendency by many philosophers to define “comparative philosophy” as equivalent to what Stepukonis calls “syncretic” and/or “cosmopolitan” philosophical methods. Bahm notes that “we cannot solve new problems with regional solutions” and that synthesis is required to achieve peace.[50] This later case that Bahm presents is not comparative but syncretic by the definition established by Stepukonis. As mentioned above (in note 35), Chung-Ying Cheng also uses the term “comparative philosophy” to connote what Stepukonis calls “philosophical syncretism.” How prevalent is this equivalency?
Bahm’s form of comparative philosophy faces obstacle three (c) due to the potential biases that may arise, along with obstacle one, due to its intention to synthesize the world’s philosophies into one. It also faces obstacle two due to the suggestion of a practical application. Therefore, neither of Bahm’s suggestions for comparative philosophy and global philosophy are adequate. Bahm was mentioned as a preparation to Stepukonis’ definition. The two issues covered above (Can comparative philosophy be used as a method to integrate philosophies of the world into a global philosophy? and Is this equivalency in “comparative” terms a prevalent occurrence?) must be considered when evaluating Stepukonis’ definition of the comparative method as global philosophy.
Comparative Method
Stepukonis’ definition of a “comparative philosophy” is based on the comparative movement that originated in Hawaii
Demonstrates open-mindedness, breath of spirit, receptivity, and, what is most important, it never rests with the finite categories of any philosophical system, instead it tries to reach beyond these categories by investigating other, perhaps, strange intellectual traditions, by probing their past cultural heritage as well as present intellectual developments.[51]
This type of method seems all inclusive, which avoids obstacle one mentioned above. This method also does a side-by-side comparison of the philosophies of the world, avoiding claims of superiority or authority. By claiming no authority, the comparative method also avoids some aspects of obstacle three (a and b). Stepukonis does not mention whether the comparative method has any practical applications claiming that a practical application is premature and therefore an obstacle. So the assumption is that the comparative movement also should avoid a practical application. Stepukonis explains that one of the discoveries found through a comparative method in philosophy is that “the comparative method in philosophy is but a means for acquiring and communicating cultural experience.”[52] Since it is a tool to share the manifold philosophical perspectives, it should avoid obstacle two as well by not suggesting any practical applications.
In addition to some insightful discoveries,[53] Stepukonis’ comparative method is beneficial because it avoids the syncretic obstacles. However, it also poses various problems. Developing an atmosphere or supplying a theater to share philosophical perspectives is not enough to interpret fully a particular philosophy. In an attempt to compare certain theories, there have been many misunderstood “Westernized” or “Orientalized” concepts that can only make sense in relation to the region in which they were developed. Stepukonis states that what is needed is “a certain inner disposition, a sincere and unbiased interest in and receptiveness” that allows a deeper, experiential understanding of the philosophical perspectives being shared.[54] The comparative method can fall into a certain aspect of obstacle three (c) because personal and regional biases, what Stepukonis calls “philosophical provincialism,” are possible, causing a lack of interpretive strength due to experiential limitations. Therefore the comparative method is inadequate to interpret fully diverse philosophies. I call this problem “the problem of interpretive capacity.”
As seen above, Bahm’s comparative and global philosophies pose two related questions for the comparative method: (A) If it is only a facilitator of dialogue, can comparative philosophy be used as a method to integrate philosophies of the world into a global philosophy? (B) Is the term “comparative philosophy” being used as equivalent to “philosophical syncretism” and/or “philosophical cosmopolitanism?”
In the case of the former (A), it seems that comparative philosophy, as Bahm states, is only another field of philosophy.[55] Comparative philosophy does not constitute a method. It only provides an environment where world philosophies can share their perspectives to find similarities, differences universals, or particularities. Perhaps, through this dialogue we might become more aware of other philosophies, be more inclined to import some aspects of a foreign philosophy, or change philosophy altogether to deal with issues raised by foreign philosophies. However, comparative philosophy does not seem to have the means to develop some sort of integrating function that will decisively unite the philosophies being compared into one global philosophy. Comparative philosophy will always be based in one’s “home” philosophy.[56] If comparative philosophers attempt to involve themselves in such a task, the resulting comparative philosophy will be syncretic and will face many problems.
The second main obstacle for the comparative method is what I call the “problem of the capacity to integrate.” In many cases, the term “comparative philosophy” refers to what Stepukonis calls “philosophical syncretism and cosmopolitanism.” Many of the articles in the journal Philosophy East & West are comparative in orientation but may have characteristics that connote syncretic or cosmopolitan approaches. Examples offered in this paper are comparative in nature but also include some characteristics of syncretism. Comparative philosophy is the more prevalent term, however, this seems to be a lesser problem. One can use one’s own judgment to decipher what sense of the term each philosopher is utilizing and thereby evaluate it in those terms.
These problems of capacity can be included in the previously mentioned obstacles as follows:
1. Improbability of lumping or reconciling distinct philosophical platforms because it weakens the integrity of the philosophical viewpoints.
2. Synthesis leads to a premature practical action.
a. Problems of authority and stability.
b. Problems of selecting authorities who can function as a filter.
c. Problems of stability due to the dynamic nature of philosophy.
d. Problems of prejudice or biases—the “Mine is better than yours” syndrome.
e. Appeals to current world-dominating dogmas —the “If you can’t beat them, join them” syndrome.
3. Problems of capacity.
a. Interpretive.
b. Integrative.
From my observations, most comparative works face at a minimum, problems three (c) and (d), or four, and often all of the above (due to the fact that some comparative philosophies have syncretic implications).
Two contemporary cases of comparative philosophy are the New Neo-Confucians and contemporary Buddhists. The third wave of New Neo-Confucians is currently being led by Chung-Ying Cheng, Liu Shuxian, and Tu Wei-ming.[57] This movement seeks to develop a global philosophy with Confucian underpinnings by comparing Confucian concepts to those of “Western” philosophies.[58] The book edited by Chung-Ying Cheng and Nicholas Bunnin, Contemporary Chinese Philosophy, covers the background and current manifestations of the New Neo-Confucian Movement. The accounts show how the New Neo-Confucian movement has developed through a comparative engagement with Western philosophy, such as the philosophies of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Spinoza, Bergson, Dewey, Russell, and Kant. This has allowed the New Neo-Confucian movement to respond to many critical and conceptual disjunctions between Western and Chinese thought. As Chung-Ying Cheng states, “Chinese philosophy in the twentieth century started with its discovery of Western philosophy and proceeded to rediscover itself.”[59]
As a result of this redevelopment of Neo-Confucianism and with the inclusion of Western philosophical ideas, concepts, critical methodologies, etc., this movement claims that it has the right to be viewed as a global philosophy. Through a Sino-Western synthesis, two new global philosophical types of thinking have emerged: “One is interpretation across ontologies and methodologies and the other is globalization of ethics and epistemology.”[60] These two new global philosophical types of thinking, in turn, can contribute towards:
A global ethics of virtue and right, a global metaphysics of the dao and God, a global epistemology of naturalization and transcendence, a global political philosophy of justice and harmony, a global aesthetics of genius and refinement, a global logic of communication and understanding, and a global science of human well-being and liberation.[61]
Potentially, this comparative approach to global philosophy faces many of the same obstacles presented earlier. The most obvious obstacle is that this movement attempts to synthesize principles of Chinese and Western backgrounds into some basic principles (obstacle one), which is problematic because it eliminates many important principles and ideas. For example, Neo-Confucianism includes the Daoistic metaphysics of dao as ultimate reality, comparing and synthesizing that idea into a combination of “a global metaphysics of dao and God.” Yet it excludes many other important principles, such as the principle of zi-ran—the spontaneous predisposition to understand dao. By eliminating zi-ran from dao, the potential for misunderstanding Daoist metaphysics is very likely. The New Neo-Confucian movement seems to be a worthy candidate for global philosophy because it recommends practical applications of global ethics, etc. Nonetheless, it may lead to a premature practical application (obstacle two).
A regional philosophy like the New Neo-Confucianism is already synthesized, since it has already selected certain aspects of “indigenous” Chinese philosophy. To synthesize philosophical principles from two distinct continents into their foundational structure, and then to claim that their movement is worthy of being considered a global philosophy, shows a high level of arrogance. Galik agrees, advising:
The Chinese Neo-Confucians, who present now the most promising partners for Sino-Western dialogue, should persuade their colleagues in the global village about the strong points of their teaching in the spirit of mutual respect, without any feeling of their own self-pride and self-praise. Do not blow your trumpet, is valid in every intercultural communication and its processes.[62]
The New Neo-Confucian movement faces obstacles three (c) due to its potential prejudices. It exudes an “air” of superiority because it was able to overcome the current world-dominating dogma methodologies, conceptualizations, and critiques, thereby warranting global status (obstacle 3d).
One last problem involves a sub-sect of obstacle one. The New Neo-Confucian movement assumes that its comparative philosophy is worthy of global status. However, its comparisons and synthesis are focused solely on the Sino-Western context. What about philosophies in the rest of the world? What about world religions? If a sincere attempt to globalize philosophy is to occur, there must be, at the very least, a minimal comparison of all major world philosophies and religions. However, the likelihood of this happening is slim. My skeptical sentiments are based on the fact that, as Bahm states, the philosophical and religious content of the world is “magnitudinous” and the likeliness of doing a fair comparison is highly improbable. The comparative project is a constant work in progress; over time and through various contributors it must accumulate immense amounts comparative insights drawn from the various philosophical and religious sources of world wisdom. Only then can it be considered an adequate method of global philosophy. In the case of the New Neo-Confucian movement, even if it were to provide an adequate comparison of all the major philosophies and religions of the world, and also were able to find certain fundamental commonalities, the movement cannot be considered global because it merely provides information. For a global philosophy to exist, there must be some method that will allow an active participation or an experiential global mindset, not merely insights on the differences and similarities of the world. A global philosophy must have a participatory global perspective. Therefore, the New Neo-Confucian movement also faces the comparative method’s seemingly inevitable obstacle four.
Another movement involves Buddhist pundits and scientists who examine and compare the findings of science and Buddhism in their search for universal truth. The Dalai Lama is taking the leading role here, while Alan B. Wallace, Jeremy W. Hayward, Francisco J. Varela, and J.K.P. Ariyaratne have presented their own works on this subject.[63] The Dalai Lama’s main motivations for such a comparative undertaking is to show how science touches every aspect of human life. However, he does not seem to believe that science has served humanity adequately nor sufficiently because it lacks focus into subjective experience and ethical concerns: “Perhaps the most important point is to ensure that science never becomes divorced from the basic human feeling of empathy with our fellow beings.”[64] Various areas of our human existence, such as metaphysical questions, values, creativity and spirituality, lie beyond the scope of science. Wallace adds that science has provided “little value” to those subjective or personal experiences of living within the world, such as mental contentment.[65] Therefore the insights provided by a comparison between science and Buddhism can be meaningful to the “global village”: “The meaningfulness of scientific and contemplative knowledge [such as Buddhism] is therefore complementary. In the absence of either, the world is impoverished.”[66] Both the Dalai Lama and Wallace suggest that Buddhism should run through the scientific “gauntlet” but in addition “the objective appraisal of the latter may require testing those assertions by engaging in the Buddhist practices oneself, just as one might test a scientific theory by running experiments oneself.”[67]
In these comparative efforts by some Buddhists and scientists can be discerned an attempt by the Buddhist party to ally itself with the current world-dominating dogma of science and thus spread Buddhist ideas. I believe that the Dalai Lama has compassionate intentions and perhaps is attempting to practice a fundamental Buddhist principle called upāya (skillful means) to eliminate the suffering of sentient beings.[68] However, I am hesitant to believe that such a comparative approach is healthy, even if it is not the ultimate intention of the Dalai Lama and the rest. First of all, by suggesting such a comparison, these Buddhists may be misinterpreted as suggesting that science is a worthy and stable system of thought. However, science and its position of world dominance are bound to change. Global philosophy should not have as its method a comparative philosophy that is subject to change for it would destabilize the sustainability of a global philosophy (obstacle 3b). Secondly, some might actually misinterpret the Dalai Lama’s intention, assuming that he wants Buddhism to merge or inextricably ally itself with science (obstacle 3d). Although that does not seem to be the case, it seems possible that some followers and/or readers might misinterpret it as so.
One positive consequence does derive from the efforts of these Buddhists and scientists. By suggesting that scientists should immerse themselves in subjective experiential awareness of their findings, this comparative movement avoids many of the obstacles posed by assuming no prejudice. It requires both parties sincerely and actively to participate in each other’s party explorations. Stepukonis calls this type of active role in foreign viewpoints “active philosophical cosmopolitanism.”[69] Let us look further into Stepukonis definition of “philosophical cosmopolitanism.”
Philosophical Cosmopolitanism
Stepukonis claims that philosophical cosmopolitanism “constitutes the highest, clearest, and most effective conception of a world philosophy.”[70] Reiterating the definition of “philosophical cosmopolitanism” presented by Moore
Do both types of philosophical cosmopolitanism avoid the problems of capacity (obstacle 4, a and b) posed above? In terms of interpretive obstacles, it seems that both the receptive and active types of philosophical cosmopolitanism would avoid obstacle four (a) because they allow philosophers to become fully immersed in the foreign philosophical viewpoints. However, just experiencing the philosophical viewpoints does not necessarily mean that one’s interpretation and experience is consistent with the original experience. Who can judge whether one’s experience is the right one? If some agency is required to substantiate the experience, who would that be? Both cases of philosophical cosmopolitanism would face obstacle four (a) due to the incapacity adequately to interpret foreign philosophical viewpoints. Both types of philosophical cosmopolitanism face the problem of interpretation.
How does philosophical cosmopolitanism engage the philosopher into an integrative global standpoint? In the receptive type of philosophical cosmopolitanism, a philosopher’s mindset is receptive to foreign philosophies to such an extent that they become part of the philosopher’s overall mode of thinking, allowing the thinker to “draw fresh philosophical experience.”[75] This would seem to produce an adequate type of global philosophy. However, this is not necessarily the case. Receptive philosophical cosmopolitanism merely provides new philosophical experience of the content that has been introduced or presented. If certain world philosophies have not been presented or introduced to that thinker, then there is no way of experiencing them. Therefore, the new type of philosophical experience is limited to insights that the thinker has been exposed to, which may not be global in scope. One can argue that through time, one can gain a sufficient number of world philosophical experiences, thereby warranting global philosophical status. However, I cannot imagine a case where multiple philosophical viewpoints could be introduced and then incorporated into one’s thinking to provide fresh globe-encompassing philosophical insights. Therefore, the receptive type of philosophical cosmopolitanism can be subject to obstacle four (b).
The active type of philosophical cosmopolitanism also can fall into the pitfalls of integrating capacity. By actively grasping and experiencing other philosophical viewpoints, active philosophical cosmopolitanism seems to provide a greater capacity to understand and experience more world philosophies, thereby gaining more new philosophical experiences and insights. However, I do not believe that merely extending the quantity of philosophical viewpoints can get us closer to a global perspective. The available philosophical contents around the world are too massive to integrate successfully into a global philosophical perspective. One could argue that if one accumulates a significant amount of world philosophical insight, one can find fundamental elements that all philosophies share thereby experiencing a higher-order global perspective and confirming the possibility of global philosophy.
To examine this claim more concretely, Gangadean’s example of philosophical cosmopolitanism is presented. Ashok K. Gangadean sought to produce a form of global perspective that could provide a unifying ultimate truth. For Gangadean, “global perspective” refers to a type of perspectivity that “is situated in a higher order rational space” where diverse worldviews are embraced and “inter-perspectivity flourishes.”[76] Since we seem to have a “powerful intuition that thought is unified [...] that truth is primitively univocal and absolute,” Gangadean believes that comparative thought “presupposes that there is some kind of univocal ontologically neutral absolute truth, that there is some kind of ‘common ground’ for human consciousness.”[77] Hence “the most important challenge for comparative thought is whether there can be univocal truth between different worlds.”[78] Gangadean poses the question, “Is comparative thought possible?”[79] If there is no absolute truth (noting that there are two polar paradigms of thought: logical and ontological), then the effort of comparative philosophy seems trivial.
These different logical and ontological paradigms are ways we relate to reality in completely different conceptual languages, yet each paradigm always attempts to unify reality and fails to fulfill adequate coherence.[80] Gangadean believes that for comparative thought to have some value, it must provide a unifying ultimate truth. Yet, these two polarities of thought cannot be synthesized nor can they be treated separately. So does comparative thought prove to be inept? If the comparative method has reached its limit, “it becomes necessary to shift to a radically different model of worldly thought, to move to a ‘transcendental’ unity of consciousness.”[81] He suggests that this transcendental shift requires a move from egocentric and monocentric patterns of thinking—a form of processing that separates the self from the object being thought—to a holistic minding of global reasoning—a minding that unveils the interconnectedness and co-creativeness of the field of reality.[82] Gangadean explores the way that our thinking comports itself—the way “we use our minds”[83]—which he calls “the technology of minding.”[84] In this transcendental shift[85] the two paradigms are seen neither as two distinct perspectives, nor as two perspectives synthesized, but rather as “two polar paradigms mutually superimposed”—a global perspective.[86]
Gangadean suggests that this kind of global perspective was prevalent in many great philosophers; Laozi, Buddha, Socrates, Plato, Moses, Krishna , Jesus, and others attempted to elucidate a “Primal Source,” what Gangadean refers to as “First Philosophy.” The primary insight provided by First Philosophy is “The Global Hermeneutical Axiom—that we are as we mind:”[87]
We humans, through our interpretive activity, co-create our worlds. We may call this the hermeneutical axiom: The highest human art is the art of world making, of shaping the ecology of mind wherein we render our worldview and narrate our reality. This global truth—that to be human is to interpret, that our experience is essentially constituted in our interpretive activity—may be distilled as one of the major findings in the evolution of philosophical thought.[88]
Through our transcendental shift of thought into a global perspective, we become active participants in the construction or structuring of our world. Therefore, Gangadean suggests a global grammar and “technology of mind” that will facilitate our understanding of the global field of reality. Gangadean calls such a global perspective the “holistic unified field of the Logosphere.”[89]
Gangadean’s presentation is a concrete example of an active willingness sincerely and respectfully to gain new philosophical insight by “going out” and evaluating many philosophical and religious standpoints. He finds that most philosophies share a fundamental principle—the global hermeneutical axiom. His philosophical proposal—the system of the holistic unified field of the Logosphere—suggests a transcendental shift of mindset and experiential involvement in the creation of a global consciousness. This is initiated by presenting a global grammar and method of minding that will facilitate the global perspective—the Logosphere. The way Gangadean applies the term “global perspective” parallels Stepukonis’ description of “fresh philosophical experience” due to the interactive and participatory role found in both. By being active in philosophical investigation and offering fresh philosophical experience, Gangadean provides an appropriate example of an active philosophical cosmopolitanism.
But does any philosophical cosmopolitanism, such as Gangadean’s version, have the tenable capacity (interpretive and integrative) to be considered a global philosophy? In terms of interpretive capacity, does Gangadean’s active philosophical cosmopolitanism provide adequate interpretive consistencies? Gangadean derives his Logosphere viewpoint from active philosophical cosmopolitanism participation in many philosophical viewpoints, leading to the common, “global hermeneutical axiom.” This axiom, along with further active philosophical cosmopolitanism participation, elucidates that a holistic type of minding is the preferable method of minding. He refers to various world philosophical and religious viewpoints (Buddhist, Hindu, “Greco-European,” and Judeo-Christian religion) to support his claim for the holistic type of minding that he champions. Even if we disregard the fact that his references are limited (obstacle one—he does not include African ethno-philosophy or Native American mythology, for example), his interpretation of Nāgārjuna— Mahāyāna Buddhism—seems inconsistent. Claiming that Nāgārjuna demonstrates that ‘egocentric’ ‘reason’ or ‘logic’ that presumes independent (nonrelational) entities as having self-existence is fundamentally incoherent, unsustainable, and self-contradictory, Gangadean concludes that Nāgārjuna advocates a holistic perspective. This is not the case. Although Nāgārjuna does in fact claim that an “egocentric”—type of minding is inconsistent, he also claims that a holistic-type is also inconsistent.[90] This is so because Nāgārjuna claims that there isn’t any difference between any two sides, such as the dualistic “reality” of the worlds of samsāra and nirvāņa:[91] “There is not the slightest difference between cyclic existence [samsāra] and nirvāņa.”[92] Nāgārjuna avoids any particular stance because there is not particular theory, principle, or meaningful “Dharma” (doctrine) that was “taught by the Buddha at any time, in any place, to any person.[93] Gangadean’s interpretation does not seem adequate. Gangadean can surely provide more evidence to his case, but the interpretation inconsistencies cannot be avoided. Therefore, Gangadean’s version of active philosophical cosmopolitanism is incapable of interpreting without debate and interpretational or hermeneutical obstacles.
In terms of the capacity to integrate, Gangadean’s version of active philosophical cosmopolitanism is inept because it advocates a transformation to a holistic mindset that he believes, based on his questionable findings, is the consistent “global wisdom” of the ancients. Gangadean’s proposal of the Logosphere cannot appropriately be applied if the transcendental, or the “fresh philosophical experiential” shift, is that of an inconsistent holistic viewpoint. Therefore, Gangadean’s version of active philosophical cosmopolitanism cannot provide an adequate methodology for a global philosophy.
Stepukonis presents us with a solid background of various methods of integration. The examples presented above were intended to provide more concrete evidence of the three methods presented by Stepukonis—syncretic, comparative, and philosophical cosmopolitanism. Along with the obstacles or pitfalls that Stepukonis mentions, additional obstacles were presented to show that the method Stepukonis advocates—philosophical cosmopolitanism—is not without its flaws. All the methods presented fail to support a sustainable global philosophy. The main contribution of this exposition was to point out the obstacles that need to be avoided if a method for global philosophy is to be sustainable. What follows is a discussion of the suggested conditions for sustainability.
Conditions for Sustainability
It is now clear that a global philosophical undertaking faces many complexities. Some of the obstacles do not seem to be avoidable. However, by presenting possible conditions for sustainability, perhaps we can circumvent those obstacles. Since these obstacles seem to be prevalent in many methods proposed for a global philosophy, the first condition for sustainability is to avoid these obstacles.
The general problem seen from the above exposition is that even before a method to philosophize globally can be evaluated for adequacy, the content, or the suggested theories, ideas, concepts that philosophers propose are brought to the table. Most of the examples present their methods along with their theoretical suggestions. In order for global philosophy to have any content whatsoever, it must first have a method. After all, that was the initial intention of Moore and the rest of those engaged in the comparative movement in Hawaii
The two conditions that are proposed towards a sustainable global philosophy are:
1. Avoidance of the obstacles presented above.
2. Emphasis on the method or how one ought to philosophize globally rather than any global philosophical theory, concept, or idea.
Stepukonis’ approach was an exemplary case of how one should present proposals for a sustainable global philosophy. He avoids most of the problems above by presenting only methods and not any particular philosophical stance. Ultimately though, Stepukonis’ proposal of philosophical cosmopolitanism faces problem because he still believes that a global philosophy can be achieved with genuine philosophical integration of the various philosophical viewpoints the world has to offer. However, as we have seen above, the massive amount of philosophical content seems to be hindering the project of global philosophy because every philosopher is scrambling to provide evidence why his or her combination of worldviews is an adequate global philosophy. In fact, the task or intention of integrating world philosophies into a global philosophy seems futile. Why is it that a global philosophy must include regional based philosophical insights? Finding common ground among some of the philosophical viewpoints to incite another more-combined philosophical viewpoint will never fully encompass the world’s massive and vast amount of viewpoints. Even if it were possible to combine a “significant” number of philosophical viewpoints, who would be able genuinely to absorb such a massive amount of insight? Agencies, computers, libraries can hold all the philosophies of the world, but unless someone can make them his or her own, the project of integrating philosophies of the world into a global philosophy seems otiose. Hence, Stepukonis’ philosophical cosmopolitanism is untenable for a sustainable global philosophy.
In order to philosophize globally, as Gangadean envisions, one has to have a global perspective. That global perspective must have the power to recreate the world into whatever it will become, philosophically or otherwise. To accomplish such a task, a transcendental shift of mindset is needed, as Gangadean suggests. Gangadean’s vision and my suggestion part ways in terms of the way to approach the transcendental shift of minding. Gangadean suggests a philosophical viewpoint that is prevalent in the world—the holistic approach—is a better way for our minds to comport themselves about the holistic perspective through his grammar and technology of mind that will “bring the mature and generic form of this foundational transformation into the space of global reason.”[94]
The purpose and proposal of this thesis involves the transcendental shift from a global philosophy with philosophical content as a foundation—theories, concepts, systems or, as Gangadean suggests, a grammar and technology of mind—to a global type of minding with no content whatsoever as the foundation. If we are to create a new way of thinking and a new way of looking at the world, then we must take the advice of Laozi and “return to the root”[95] where spontaneous thought (zi-ran) creates the world but does not hold on to any worldly contents. Without any content to limit thought, humanity can look at humanity and the world globally.
This shift in mindset does not imply a global philosophy. However, I contend that there is no better way to prepare the initial stages for a sustainable global philosophy than to figure out how it is that we will mind in a global scale. This transcendental shift in mindset can satisfy the conditions for a sustainable global philosophy stated above because it is a type of minding that has no content to trap. Without any particular philosophies to select, the mind is not constrained by the guidelines of understanding that are imposed by those particular philosophies. Furthermore, because such a mindset does not have a set view of what type of philosophy will come about through this shift, only that the means by which we will derive our global mindset—the method—should only be addressed. If global philosophy is going to be sustainable, the essence of global philosophy must transform from a philosophy that explores theories, systems, and/or concepts in a global perspective to a philosophy that explores the manner in which our mind operates and interacts with the world. Hence, global philosophy is a philosophy of minding on a global scale.
Some would be very reluctant to eliminate the content of philosophy as it has been studied for hundreds or thousands of years from discussions of global philosophy. For those who claim that this amounts to casting-off all philosophical “advancement,” I want to stress how philosophy, specifically the comparative type, must still play a major role in determining a methodology for a global philosophy. The following is a brief account of my experience at a comparative conference held by the recognized leading university in comparative philosophy—a philosophical discipline that compares disciplines of the world to gain further insight into one’s own philosophical understanding.
In March 2008, University of Hawaii
The discussions among conference participants dealt directly with the issues posited in this thesis. There seems to be no way that comparative philosophy, or philosophy in general, as it is structured at this time, is capable of dealing with global issues, as Thomas Kasulis stated in the keynote presentation of the Uehiro CrossCurrents conference.[99] Hence we need to find a new way of thinking and new way of integrating philosophy into an expanded field of thought. My thesis incorporates the sentiments shared in this conference by suggesting that we allow philosophy, comparative or otherwise, to play an edifying role in a new way of minding in a global scale. Comparative philosophy can still help us study the philosophies of the world. But we must examine how the great figures in human history derived their thoughts. The comparative movement should shift directions from comparing what content philosophers developed to comparing how they got there. One possible example is the comparative examination prepared in the next section of this thesis.
The next section of my thesis provides one suggestion for deriving a global mindset. The method proposed is the method of deconstruction. I will present a definition of deconstruction, a brief illustration of various forms of deconstruction, along with some philosophies/ers that champion such forms both in the Asian traditions and in the Amero-European tradition.
Chapter 3
The primary goal of this section is to present my understanding of the project of deconstruction, including its intention and where that intention may lead. Defining “deconstruction” is a complex task. Although Derrida is considered the father of the deconstructive enterprise, deconstruction and everything that is implied in the term may not entirely be attributed only to him. Derrida’s notion of “deconstruction” has been applied to thinkers hundreds of years apart and hundreds of miles away from France Asia , including the Mahāyāna Buddhist sect, Nāgārjuna, Candrikīrti, Seng-Zhao, Tsong kha pa, Jizang and Dōgen, the Daoist philosophy of Zhuangzi and Laozi, and the Neo-Daoist movement of Guo Xiang.[100]
Finding a meaning behind Derrida’s overall project alone can provide great frustration for any student of philosophy. To further add what seems to be other deconstructive forms from the Asian perspectives verges on the masochistic. However, there seems to be a consistent message that all these philosophies are attempting to convey. What follows is by no means an exhaustive account of Derrida’s or any of the other philosophers’ stances and doctrines. Instead, it is an effort to compare the original intention of Derrida’s deconstruction to that of his Asian counterparts to see if there is room to develop a more expansive meaning of the deconstructive enterprise.
Therefore, this section will start of by examining a letter from Derrida to a Japanese friend to uncover his most simple explanation of the meaning and intention of deconstruction. Then we will expand this definition by adding insights from various philosophers and commentators to develop an expanded explanation of Derrida’s deconstruction. Lastly, I will combine contributions from Asian forms of deconstruction. What will be shown through this analysis is that deconstruction’s expansive applicability allows the underlying intention, which will be shortly discussed, to be more thoroughly fulfilled.
The last part of this section will further illustrate how deconstruction is not only expansive and not uncommon in the world of philosophy, such that other philosophical methodologies with deconstructive tendencies may have been overlooked. I will briefly interpret various European philosophical methods as forms of the deconstructive enterprise. This will further elucidate the expansiveness and effectiveness of deconstruction for dealing with global issues.
Derrida’s Letter to a Japanese Friend
In a dialogue with a Professor Toshihiko Izutsu, Derrida attempted to provide a clear and succinct explanation of what deconstruction seeks to convey. Evaluating his volumes of literary work to find how and where he developed the notion of deconstruction would require a thesis of its own. Hence the correspondence from Derrida to Professor Izutsu provides a simple and clear explanation of his development of deconstruction. Sometimes, when I find myself attempting to express a Spanish notion in English, I work diligently to find the clearest and most succinct expression, leaving little room for interpretational mistakes. The basic and fundamental intention is what I attempt to get across, not the clutter of a single-language explanation. For that reason, I feel that Derrida’s correspondence to Professor Izutsu can shed a clearer and more intense light on Derrida’s intention and the underlying meaning of deconstruction.
By intention and underlying meaning, I mean a course of action one plans to implement to achieve a certain goal. An adequate explanation of deconstruction should not end with “deconstruction is” but rather “deconstruction leads us towards….” I will explain the complications that Derrida is faced with when he is attempts to explain the notion of deconstruction. Though the words and definitions lead us to a certain end, we always must keep in mind that the end itself is also in question. So insofar as Derrida attempts to explain deconstruction, he can only go as far as explaining what it is not, allowing our minds to wander where deconstruction may lead us.
Derrida explains the origins of his term of choice, “deconstruction,” by refering back to Heidegger’s word Destruktion which “signified in this context an operation bearing on the structure or traditional architecture of the fundamental concepts of ontology or of Western metaphysics.”[101] This word conveyed something similar to his notion. However, in French, this term connoted a sense of elimination or annihilation that sounded more like Nietzschean “demolition” than Heideggerian intended. Thus Derrida sought another term closer to what he was trying to convey. The French word for “deconstruction” seemed to lend itself better to what he was trying to portray. However, as it was defined in French, “deconstruction” was also limited to a grammatico-linguistic, mechanistic sense which required “deconstructive questioning” because this would restrict the deconstructive enterprise to models or structures. Derrida explains the context of deconstruction to Izutsu as:
structuralist gesture or in any case a gesture that assumed a certain need for the structuralist problematic. But it was also an antistructuralist gesture, and its fortune rests in part on this ambiguity. Structures were to be undone, decomposed, desedimented (all types of structures, linguistic, “logocentric,” “phonocentric”—structuralism being especially at that time dominated by linguistic models and by a so-called structural linguistics that was also called Saussurian—socio-institutional, political, cultural, and above all and from the start philosophical.) This is why, especially in the United States , the motif of deconstruction has been associated with “poststructuralism” (a word unknown in France until its “return” from the US
So this notion of deconstruction is faced with a negative appearance, whereas Derrida considered it to be beyond positive and negative dichotomies. Yet to deconstruct the negative sense of “deconstruction,” he felt the need to “multiply the cautionary indicators and put aside all the traditional philosophical concepts, while reaffirming the necessity of returning to them, at least under erasure.”[103]
For the above mentioned reasons, Derrida was not completely satisfied with the term “deconstruction”. However, he kept the term while attempting to distinguish it from its original connotation. Pursuing his negative explanation of deconstruction for Izutsu, he claims that deconstruction is not an analysis, a critique, a method, an idiom or signature, an act or operation. In fact, insofar as we can determine what deconstruction is, deconstruction is lost. Derrida affirms, “All sentences of the type ‘deconstruction is X’ or ‘deconstruction is not X’ a priori miss the point.”[104] If any notion is defined, determined and contains a privileged significance, then those notions are deconstructible including the notion of deconstruction itself. To Derrida, deconstruction is a state. It is happening, “Ça se deconstruit” (it deconstructs itself).[105] Near the end of the letter Derrida states, “What deconstruction is not? everything of course! What is deconstruction? nothing of course!”[106]
Derrida’s attempt to clarify deconstruction to his Japanese friend leaves its meaning and intention very opaque. Overall, although he believes that the word “deconstruction” is not a very good choice of words, it does play a significant role in clarifying the “highly determined situation” that the world is in. “It [deconstruction] has definitely been of service in a highly determined situation. In order to know what has been imposed upon it in a chain of possible substitutions, despite its essential imperfection, this ‘highly determined situation’ will need to be analyzed and deconstructed.”[107] Derrida seems to be indicating that insofar as deconstruction has been used, it has done some service by dealing with the problems of determination and challenging the absolute significances of terms, notions, and theories. The underlying meaning and intention of Derrida in using the term is a form of therapeutic practice to lead to some state. He hopes that his Japanese friend has other terms that may better connote and serve as substitutes for his “ugly” term and “lead elsewhere” beyond what is written and transcribed.[108]
Derrida’s underlying message and intention concerning the use of deconstruction from its original Heideggerian derivation shows the limits of our linguistic-grammatical-phonocentric structuring. It also points towards a certain state that has deconstruction as a point of erasure to “lead elsewhere.” Derrida affirms, “one of the principal things at stake in what is called in my texts ‘deconstruction’ is precisely the delimiting of ontology and above all of the third person present indicative: S is P […] Deconstruction takes place; it is an event that does not await the deliberation, consciousness, or organization of a subject, or even of modernity.”[109] Through his letter, Derrida presents the intention and underlying meaning of “deconstruction.” However, how he discloses or shows-the-door-towards the state of deconstruction is still not fully illuminated. How is it that deconstruction deals with grammar, linguistics, or logocentricity (the attitude that believes that there is meaning or significance in that which is disclosed—“the self-presentation of meaning”[110])? How does Derrida demonstrate that deconstruction delimits?
To address the how question, I will introduce various commentators who have applied Derrida’s deconstruction to Asian philosophers and philosophies. The goal is to expand Derrida’s notion of deconstruction by presenting how deconstruction deconstructs, specifically in Asian traditions, so that we can expand the meaning of “deconstruction” beyond Derrida’s notion.
Since this entire thesis is constructed on the assumption that deconstruction is a method, we first must acknowledge that Derrida clearly explains that deconstruction is not a method.
Deconstruction is not a method and cannot be transformed into one. Especially if the technical and procedural significations of the word are stressed. It is true that in certain circles (university or cultural, especially in the United States
To reconcile the contradiction, I will briefly address the question of method. What is a method, what does a method do, and in what sense does Derrida use the term?
By method, Derrida is referring to a fixed system or orderly process with set rules and procedures. A method in this sense has certain characteristics that allow it to be used to achieve a certain goal, in this case, “for reading and for interpretation.” However, Derrida also states that deconstruction is “precisely the delimiting of ontology,” which implies that deconstruction is some sort of activity or process (of delimiting) with a certain aim in mind—a method. If such an activity is a characteristic of deconstruction, then deconstruction may be consider a method, not in the sense of a set system or a procedure that has definitive rules and guidelines, but rather as an activity that has an underlying goal or intention. If deconstruction is a state in which delimitation is an inherent activity, then it can be seen as a method at some level.
The following presentation seeks further expansion of the notion of “deconstruction” by explaining how these commentators understood Derrida’s deconstruction and then suggest a more expansive and effective notion of “deconstruction.” With an expanded notion of deconstruction, the question of method will be addressed using creative hermeneutics. I will argue that the notion of deconstruction as a method should have been allowed by Derrida.
Expanding Deconstruction
The number of philosophers emerging as proponents of deconstruction has increased with the obvious popularity of the term.[112] Are there any grounds for the popularity or interest in expanding the deconstruction enterprise, or is it a mere fad? This part of the thesis will examine the work of some philosophers who are exploring the deconstructive possibilities of Asian philosophies. Some ask whether a particular Asian philosophy can have deconstructive attributes. Others assume that deconstruction is inherent and examine how Asian forms vary from other forms of deconstruction. Though their tasks and the philosophers and philosophies being studied vary, our focus will be their understanding of Derrida’s deconstruction, how they apply it to that particular Asian philosophical tradition, and whether the Asian traditions have additional contributions that can benefit the deconstructive enterprise without compromising its original intention.
Various commentators claim that the Mahāyāna sect of Buddhism, especially the sub-sects of Mādhyamaka (Mādhyamika), Yogācāra, Chan (China )/Zen (Japan
Commentators’ Explanations of Derrida’s Deconstruction
Mark Berkson provides the backdrop of Derrida’s period in France France
Although Bimal Matilal, from the start, claims that he does not understand Derrida’s deconstruction fully, he considers it to be a “form of philosophical criticism directed against the metaphysical or rhetorical structure of a ‘text’ or a discourse, or even a theory.”[115] The deconstructive task is not to destroy or “demolish” the structure of metaphysical or rhetorical systems, but rather to “expose its lack of any transcendental significance or meaning.”[116] Since the text[117] is not destroyed but only has its inherent limitations exposed, Matilal says that a deconstructed text is written down, crossed-out and then rewritten to include both the original text and the deleted text.[118] For Matilal, the process of deconstruction only discloses the limitations of the text. However, because the text is necessary, it is still left to play its practical role. A deconstructionist would “single out” a text that may contain a paradox or contradiction and “expose the lack of its unified meaning” to show its “undecidability” or its lack of any definitive sense of reality.
Ian W. Mabbett comments that initially he thought that the comparison between Nāgārjuna and Derrida were a playful “jeu d’esprit” (play of the heart/mind/spirit). However, when he pursued the comparison, “the more genuinely significant the similarities seemed to be. In some important sense, it seemed that people like Jacques Derrida and people like Nagarjuna are seeking to give form—a self-referring and self-canceling form—to the same vision.”[119] Mabbett believes that deconstruction is not a method but a certain state-of-being that has no recognized existence other than what it discloses as phenomena and the paradox pertaining to it: “Derrida is therefore seeking to elicit a sense of reality that always steps aside from itself. One cannot speak of it, but one can point to the conceptual space it occupies that constitutes the condition of speaking about it, the possibility of a quest.”[120] Mabbett understands Derrida’s deconstruction as some state or “special sense of reality” that allows one to see that the meaning of every text has no intrinsic meaning apart from the context that defines it. There is no definitive reality or determined world: “The world itself is composed of elements that exist only in relation to each other.”[121] Mabbett recognizes something that is central to Derrida’s intention when he explains that deconstruction should not be interpreted as mere negation. Instead we should consider that there is a sense of a two-fold deconstruction that employs a “double-affirmation.”[122] Mabbett explains:
The right [deconstructive] move employs an affirmation, albeit a paradoxical double affirmation: ‘Yes, yes.’ A statement, if it asserts something, contains an affirmation of it; but this affirmation can take on meaning only from a context—that is, by being endorsed, validated, by something outside itself, and the endorsement or validation is a second affirmation, a mention that is not the same thing as a use. In principle, the series is endless.[123]
I will return to this notion of a two-fold deconstruction or “double-affirmation” later in discussing the question of method. Derrida’s most emphasized, yet oddly misunderstood idea— that because deconstruction needs to be deconstructed, deconstruction is neither negative nor positive but an affirmative—is a consistently mentioned by all commentators in this section. For example, Jie-Wei Cheng observes:
According to Derrida, deconstruction is neither positive nor negative. It is not positive in the sense of achieving something definite and lasting. And it is not negative in the sense of denying the other, the opposite of the definite and the lasting. His denial is actually affirmative because nothing can be left out in the course of denials. And in the essential sense of the word, the unconditioned “definite” (search or trace) always underlines Derrida’s conditioned deconstructive reading.[124]
Derrida’s intention and underlying meaning of deconstruction is not to negate or destroy the text being examined but to place it in perspective. Barbara Johnson declares, “The deconstruction of text does not proceed by random doubt or generalized skepticism, but by the careful teasing out of warring forces of signification within the text itself. If anything is destroyed in deconstructive reading, it is not meaning but the claim to unequivocal domination of one mode of signifying over another.”[125] Cai states that Derrida’s notion of différance prohibits any text to have any transcendental meaning.[126] Cai declares, “Différance will condemn all logocentric concepts to an infinite circularity of signifiers and will render them incapable of presenting a transcendental absolute.”[127]
Nathan Katz contends, “Derrida maintains that language is not an evoking of a naïve presence, but that it curiously negates presence in order to re-present […] Lacking the anchor of simple referents, the reader is adrift.”[128] So Katz observes that the critic, in Derrida’s notion, has the task of deconstructing text to “shake presence” or determined existence and allow it to be put in motion to have no-particular-significance. Katz asserts, “Derrida finds that the shaking of presence is at the same time the erasure of personal identity.”[129] If the case is that no part of reality has a determined significance or meaning and the world is “adrift,” then the question or the belief of personal identity disappears or at the very least is crossed-out.
Alan Fox refers to Roger Jackson to present a relatively brief summary of Derrida’s deconstruction:
Deconstruction […] begins as a critique of the idea that there is a privileged authorial point of view to be found in literary texts and ends as an attack on the essentialist, substantialist ‘logocentrism’ or all Western philosophies of ‘presence.’ Throughout his or her critique, the deconstructionist generally is careful not to propound any privileged point of view that might itself be regarded as logocentric and hence ripe for deconstruction.[130]
Though I agree for the most part with this statement, we need to keep in mind that Derrida himself does not seem to believe that insofar as ideas are shared among people, it is an unavoidable reality that deconstruction will occur. So although the deconstructionist is careful not to fall into a logocentric trap, there should be an underlying acceptance of the fact that deconstruction is inevitable as long as a deconstructive critique or process is involved.
So far, this brief account of various commentators who have approached the deconstruction/Asian philosophy comparative only gives an overview of how Derrida establishes his deconstruction and how Derrida presents the critique. However, the actual how—the practical application of his critique—has not been addressed. Cai presents an excellent account of how Derrida deconstructs a text by addressing the actual word games and word manipulations, the lexical-syntactical deconstruction that Derrida produces, that reveal problems with text and logos.
Cai examines how Derrida “plays” with words to show their limitation. For example, he shows how Derrida’s word game or “sleight of hand” categorizes the deconstructions into typographic, morphological, orthographic, semantic, etymological, and syntactic levels.[131] In a typographic deconstruction, Derrida changes the image of the words such as “writing,” “encasing,” and “screening” to “wriTing,” “encAsing,” and “screeNing” to try to “inject doubt into our mind as to whether these words are meant to mean what they ordinarily mean.”[132] In a morphological deconstruction, Derrida introduces two opposing “morphemes” such as “de” and “construct” that incites a “dramatic sense of tension arising from a bizarre coexistence of destructive and constructive forces, a sense hitherto unconceptualized by any existing words.”[133] Derrida’s most common orthographic deconstruction is that of his notion of différance as he manipulates the normal rendering of “difference” by simply changing the spelling and showing that the original meaning of the word has different significance.[134] A semantic deconstruction is accomplished when a word is exposed as having inherent opposing or contradicting meanings. The example used by Derrida and Cai is the French word la brisure (to break; to join). Cai explains, “By so doing, he [Derrida] hopes to put us on guard against letting the word be overdetermined at the expense of its double entendre.”[135] In Derrida’s etymological deconstruction, he “traces a word to its etymological roots of opposite import and thus invalidates the monolithic conceptualization of the word in question.”[136] Lastly, in a syntactical deconstruction, Cai states that this process, not as commonly used by Derrida, is utilized as an enhancement of the other lexical deconstructions.[137] Cai’s exposition of Derrida’s lexical-syntactical deconstruction states that the process incites a certain tension or confusion in the participant that allows a breakthrough towards a “transformed state of consciousness.”[138]
An Extended Version of Derrida’s Deconstruction
Derrida’s letter to his Japanese friend disclosed his underlying motivations for using the term “deconstruction.” It also explained what deconstruction is not. Most importantly, the underlying meaning or intention was also disclosed—deconstruction “delimits” and that deconstruction “is happening.” It seems Derrida seeks to expose certain delusions about text and of reality as well as to also transform our thinking to a certain state where the awareness of “deconstruction is happening” occurs. Our minds are then no longer attached to an absolute determination but rather floating above or beyond the deconstruction “eternal cycle.” Derrida seems to be promoting a two-fold deconstruction paradigm. In one sense, deconstruction delimits by exposing contradictions and delusional idealisms. In another sense, Derrida maintains that deconstruction is an awareness of the eternal cycle of deconstruction leading to a transformation towards minding.
The commentators, for the most part, have a consistent understanding of Derrida’s deconstruction as set forth in his “Letter to a Japanese Friend”—deconstruction is an attempt to show the lack of transcendental significance or meaning in any text. They argue that this process incites a tension or conflict in the mind that leads us “adrift” towards a “transformation of consciousness.” Such a transformation has implications for the idea of personal identity because if all reality exists co-dependently, the idea of personal identity disappears. They emphasize that the deconstructive enterprise is neither negative nor positive but rather a “double-affirmation” or what I called above a two-fold paradigm.
The major conflict between Derrida’s explanation of deconstruction and the commentators’ versions is the controversy over whether Derrida’s deconstruction is a method or state. Although Derrida rejects the idea that deconstruction is a method, maintaining that it is a state, he nevertheless describes deconstruction as a state that “delimits”—the two-fold paradigm or the “double affirmation”—which leaves room for some process or method. In order to have a complete discussion of this issue, I must first present what the commentators consider worthwhile contributions from Asian versions of deconstruction. I will address who or what tradition has parallel notions of deconstruction, how these traditions or philosophers or philosophies approach deconstruction, and what these traditions contribute to the deconstructive enterprise. After expanding the explanation of deconstruction, I will address the question of method.
Asian Contributions to the Deconstruction Enterprise
Buddhism, with its many schools and sects, is a broad philosophical and religious tradition that spans the entire world. Three major schools are recognized: Hinayāna, Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna, each with its own set of sub-sects. The ancient and mysterious philosophy—Daoism, and a syncretized version influenced by Confucianism and Buddhism—Neo-Daoism, although not as widespread, also have followers across the globe. All these philosophies provide insights on and pertinent revelations of reality. The focus of this thesis is not to provide an indepth background of the various schools but rather to show what schools have been identified as having deconstructive attributes or parallels, the various commentators who have researched such parallels, and how each philosophy has contributed to expanding the deconstructive enterprise.
The major Buddhist school most often identified as having deconstructive parallels is the Mahāyāna school of Buddhism China )/Zen (Japan school of Mahāyāna Buddhism
Nāgārjuna’s main doctrine of emptiness/void (śūnyatá) is a fundamental element in almost all forms of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of emptiness assumes that to understand the true nature of reality, we need to free ourselves from all conceptualizing that inherently creates binaries of opposition and bring about suffering. To free ourselves from this suffering, we must free our minds from conceptual constructions, hence our minds become empty. Glen Martin states, “For Nāgārjuna, liberation is the ability to live fully and directly in the world without the mediation of representative thinking and conceptualization in the ‘blissful cessation of all phenomenal thought constructions.’”[139] Nāgārjuna, in his attempts to free our minds from this attachment to determinations, logically approaches traditional dogmas (in his time, the pratyayas—‘causal theory’—of the Abhidhārmikas) to expose their contradictions and independent meaninglessness. Instead he demonstrates the Doctrine of Co-Dependent Arising in his book, Mūlamadhyamikakārikās. Martin declares, “Nāgārjuna in every case, therefore, examines the dichotomies by which we characterize our world (origination and extinction, permanence and impermanence, identity and difference, enlightened and unenlightened people) and shows that we cannot logically accept either category but must face the paradox.”[140] The logical strategy in his book has been attributed to deconstruction.
Mabbett has prepared a fine comparative study of Derrida’s deconstruction and that of Nāgārjuna. Mabbett notes several similarities: “Both avoid any claim about the determinate reality”;[141] “Both identify their teaching with what is really the case [what I have referred to as a ‘state’]”;[142] “According to both, things are not intrinsically real but exist only in relation to other things”;[143] “Both criticize the logic of binary oppositions”;[144] “Both celebrate emptiness”;[145] “Both use the same four-cornered logic”;[146] “Both dismantle the concept of the self”;[147] and “Both recognize a conventional and a higher truth.”[148] Mabbett assumes that Nāgārjuna was not anti-metaphysical and that he utilized and dealt with metaphysical issues, proclaiming that metaphysics played a practical role in his philosophy. However, Nāgārjuna’s intention is to “dismantle any metaphysical claim about the existence or non-existence of any particular thing alleged to be real; such claims conceal contradictions.”[149]
The point and intention of Nāgārjuna’s critique was to transform our way of thinking from a strict discursive, concept-making mind to a type of minding that transcends linguistic traps. Martin states, “This focus is not empirical and pragmatic but revolutionary in the sense of pointing to the ‘inexpressible’ which confronts us directly in the living present, not as an alternative reality, and not ‘in front of us’ as an object, but so to speak, ‘everywhere and nowhere’ as our groundless ground.”[150] For that reason, Nāgārjuna’s notion of emptiness is not a concept but a type of minding that clings to no-particular-thing but rather floats “above” the conceptual distinctions to allow direct and spontaneous awareness of the world. Martin maintains:
Emptiness is absolutely inconceivable and inexpressible. It is not philosophical, an ontological, or an empirical concept, nor, indeed, is it a ‘concept.’ It does not escape the everyday world but involves, as Nietzsche insisted, a breakthrough and a transformation of our relation to this world. It can only be come upon through existential conversion and direct realization.[151]
Nāgārjuna’s main contribution to the deconstructive enterprise is his logical methodology of prasańga that allows our concept-constructing mind to de-condition itself and have a direct realization of emptiness. Prasańga, as Matilal states, “is regarded by most as a philosophical method by which philosophical/metaphysical theses are critically examined and shown to be internally inconsistent.”[152] Such a methodology allows a “middle-course” where there is no particular affirmation or negation of any extreme or “own-nature.”[153]
As the Mādhyamika School evolved and expanded to Tibet , China , Japan , and Korea
Nāgārjuna’s and Candrikīrti’s type of reduction sustained as a logical treatment that dealt with metaphysical or ontological issues prepared in the traditional discursive, rational, or logical framework—within the frameworks of speech and language. David Loy states, “Certainly Nāgārjuna is a philosopher’s philosopher, notorious for a laconic, knife-edged logic that wields distinctions that no one had noticed before and that many since have been unable to see the point of.”[156] Nagarjuna and Candrikīrti had serious their reservations about language. They believed that language, discursive thought—text—cannot shed any significant light on the suffering of the world. For that reason, they focused on deconstructing the sense of attachment to those static dogmas assumed to be absolute or of transcendental significance. Their highly technical use of logic seemed to have confounded the underlying intention of transformation. The message of transformation is expressed in Nāgārjuna’s text, but as Mādhyamaka spread, the message seemed to become lost in his logical “word games.”
As the method of prasańga—deconstruction—expanded to China China
Mādhyamika developed into Sanlun, which focuses on the two main works of Nāgārjuna, and the main writing of Āryadeva, with Jizang (549-623 CE) being the main proponent of the sect. Jizang studied not just Mādhyamaka texts but other schools as well, leading him to believe that the original intention of the Buddha via Nāgārjuna and then through Kumārajīva was getting lost and being sent back into the recurring cycle of dualistic conceptualization. As the notion of the two-fold truth (conventional and ultimate truth) developed, he noticed that the idea of ultimate truth was being promoted as the actual transcendental reality.
For that reason, Jizang developed his version of deconstruction: po xie xian zheng which Fox translates as “deconstructing what is misleading and revealing what is corrective.”[159] Fox sees Jizang’s deconstruction as the “checks and balances” of deconstruction so that deconstruction itself can be deconstructed and eventually discarded: “I am characterizing the deconstructive aspect of his [Jizang’s] Sanlun analysis as the critical ‘conscience’ of Buddhism.”[160] What is important and meaningful in Jizang’s contribution, Fox argues, is the process of a triple-correctiveness (three-fold deconstruction) that prepares the participant to: (1) confront one-sidedness; (2) exhaust one-sidedness (what I call the second type of affirmation, or what Derrida calls the being or state of deconstruction); and (3) “completely corrective,” which deals with the awareness that deconstruction “no longer makes sense. Yet there is still good reason to use the word.”[161] Fox justifies Jizang’s use of “deconstruction” or “corrective” on the basis of one of Buddhism’s main principles, compassion. Since we have a compassionate responsibility to show the way to others who still suffer from a “calculating mind,” we should utilize deconstruction to liberate them. Fox asserts, “Although Jizang never makes [the need to communicate or to describe the conditions of the problem] clear, it is possible that this necessity arises due to the characteristic Mahāyāna emphasis on compassion.”[162] Just as Cai declares that Seng-zhao’s deconstruction prepares the mind towards transcendence, Fox shows that Jizang’s deconstruction of the mind has compassionate undertones. Unlike Derrida’s form of deconstruction, this version of deconstruction includes a therapeutic or edifying dimension, which can beneficially expand the deconstructive enterprise.
As an edifying enterprise, deconstruction has the additional responsibility to reach-out and teach those who are suffering. However, there are many people who experience various degrees of suffering, ignorance, knowledge, or wisdom. Furthermore, in an attempt to learn and to teach—to liberate from suffering—people search for meaning in sacred texts and listen and follow teachers who might give them the “truth.” Nathan Katz addresses one such case, a hermeneutical issue of the yāna controversy, interpreting the various yānas (edifying vehicles or paths or ways—schools of Buddhism). The controversy lies in the fact that so many schools offer so many paths or ways towards liberation. Some seem to contradict others, others have sub-sects that include more yānas, others proclaim that all paths are worthy, and yet others teach that “there are no yānas at all, or the more modest claim that there really is only one yāna.”[163] So the problem comes down to figuring out which yāna is the “right” or appropriate one to learn. Katz compares the Mādhyamaka and Yogācāra schools, showing how various texts seem to have contradictory writings, instructions and suggestions, messages, and intentions.
In researching Tsong kha pa (Tibetan Buddhist 1357-1419 CE), Katz concludes that the Buddhist yāna controversy is usually engaged in text-based hermeneutics. However, he believes the controversy can be resolved by seeking a “hermeneutic based not on textuality but on the mind of the adept.”[164] Katz argues that Buddhism in general does not provide definitive doctrines, but rather doctrines accessible to different people with different needs and educational and spiritual levels can be used to elicit the appropriate wisdom. Katz suggests that Tsong kha pa deconstructed the fixed dogmas of the “definitive” yānas to show and affirm that yāna discourse is an adequate method depending on the subject who is attempting to attain the wisdom. One of the prevalent debates of Buddhism is over what yāna is the right path towards enlightenment between the Hīnayāna (lesser or smaller path) and Mahāyāna (the greater path).[165] Katz contends, “As a method for certain personality type, the so-called ‘hīnayāna’ teachings lead to full enlightenment; but for another personality type, these teachings are an obstacle.”[166] Insofar as one holds on to a particular yāna as a definite road to ultimate truth, there are grounds for deconstruction. However, just because the yānas do not have an ultimate significance, that does not mean that they cannot function as methodological, therapeutic yānas that are “under erasure.” What is significant about Katz’ account is that deconstruction has now expanded to include those who are involved in the deconstructive enterprise and their spiritual/intellectual levels. Just as the insights of Jizang promote compassion within the deconstructive enterprise, Tsong kha pa champions the use of appropriate deconstructive exercises depending on the spiritual/intellectual level of the participant.
In the Tientai tradition of Buddhism and throughout Mahāyāna Buddhism, the Lotus Sūtra is regarded as a seminal text because the various doctrines of the many sects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and the central message of Buddhism resonate in this text.[167] Hidden in the image-forming literature[168] of the Lotus Sūtra is the underlying intention of upāyic—skillful or therapeutic—transformation into Universal Buddhahood (the awareness of the capacity for everyone to be enlightened and compassionately approached or encountered in a transformed mindset).[169] The Lotus Sūtra deconstructs the notion of the above mentioned yānas while emphasizing the importance of compassionate upāya that will lead to the transformation towards minding. This skillful method allows the compassionate practitioner (bodhisattva) to use as many means to elicit the transformative minding beyond or beneath the dichotomizing, discursive mind. The compassionate being practicing upāya needs to have the capacity to appropriate the adequate means to that particular practitioner.
Although upāyic deconstruction can also be applied towards the intention of the Lotus Sūtra, one must keep in mind that other methods are also applicable. What the Lotus Sūtra can teach us about method is that the expansiveness of upāya is what makes the Lotus Sūtra “King of all Sutras.” If deconstruction is to be a compassionate method for realizing a transcendental type of minding, it needs to be as expansive as the Lotus Sūtra’s upāya. So far, the deconstructive enterprise has been limited to showing the contradictions and inadequacies of language and conceptualizing thought. However, in order for deconstruction to have a more expansive effect, it needs to go beyond the confines of language and conceptual distrust to use as many tools as possible that the Lotus Sūtra promotes and champions.
Loy compares the deconstruction of Nāgārjuna and with that of Dōgen in the Chan/Zen tradition of Mahāyāna Buddhism, showing how deconstruction can overcome the “textual” distrust. In fact, Loy believes that such distrust of language only leads to another dualism, “one that during the following millennium would become increasingly problematical: that between language and silence.”[170] For Loy, the differences between an alphabetic script (such as Sanskrit or Pāli) and an ideographic script (such as Chinese characters) might be a clue as to why he claims that Dōgen’s language is better equipped to produce a more effective form of deconstruction:
Perhaps an alphabetic script is more likely to suggest a representational understanding of meaning and truth: as letters represent sounds, so words re-present things, implying that language is something superimposed on the world. In contrast, an ideographic script seems to de-emphasize such a duality between thought and words, between meaning and reality, encouraging instead the view that thought is (part of) reality.[171]
Loy takes this stance because Dōgen seems to have more freedom to manipulate traditional readings by “playing” with the ideographs so that they can “misinterpret” and “contradict orthodox teachings.”[172] The linguistic liberty taken by Dōgen toward traditional texts is indicative of his “outside the box” approach to problems of conceptual dualities. His usage of metaphors, myth, parables, poetry, etc. (what I call image-forming literature) not only exemplifies another upāyic method to elicit transformation, it is the transformation or the truth itself.[173] This means that another dimension to deconstruction is being suggested by Loy. He suggests that Dōgen’s ability to deconstruct through image-forming literature not only shows that deconstruction can be expanded into these types of linguistic forms, thereby eliminating the textual distrust, but that the image or the idea being transmitted within this literature illuminates of the transformed mind. The deconstructive enterprise can integrate image-forming literature as a tool to “delimit” and to expose the “state” as well.
The use and promotion of image-forming literature is nothing new in Asia, particularly in China , Japan , and Korea China
However, the use of image-forming literature to deconstruct static dogmas was primarily advanced by Daoist philosophy. Laozi (6th century BCE) was considered to be the founder of Daoism, later followed by Zhuangzi (4th century BCE). As the influences of Confucianism became static and the principles of Buddhism become more prevalent, Neo-Daoism developed and the classics of the Daodejing (the Laozi—the classic of the virtues of change) and the Zhuangzi were carefully (some might argue, too carefully) examined, commented on and reinterpreted.[176]
Daoist image-forming literature incites transcendental thinking by relativizing and exposing the dualistic nature of conceptual construction. Laozi uses image-forming literature to show the dualistic nature of the determining mind points out a path of liberation. Throughout the Daodejing, there are disclaimers that warn against the fixation on a particular static “way” advising us to clear away those significances.[177] One such example is found in Chapter 42:
Dao gives birth to One;
One gives birth to Two;
Two give birth to Three;
Three give birth to Ten Thousand Things.
Ten Thousand Things carry Yin and embrace Yang,
In the opening section of the chapter, Laozi warns us that the determination of any particular thing (the birth of One) creates the dualism of Two (that determination and its inherent opposite) and that the interaction or co-dependence between the two will “give birth to the Three” (acceptance and rejection of both). Under this initial determination, the systematization of reality is created and “gives birth to the Ten Thousand Things.”[179] These determinations are not the real Dao but a named or determined version of Dao, as the first two statements of Chapter 1 profess, “Dao that may be daoed (expressed or determined) is not enduring Dao;\ Name that may be named is not enduring Name.”[180] Because Laozi’s aims not merely to show the limitations of a conceptualizing mind but to provide some direction as to how to transform an individual and a society/nation, his deconstructive efforts are for the most part largely overlooked, misinterpreted, hidden, although implicitly suggested. One such example where he provides such advice is Chapter 14. Laozi says:
Attain ultimate vacuity,
Preserve tranquillity to the utmost.
Ten Thousand Things all come into being,
And I thereby contemplate their return.
All things flourish,
Each returning to its own root [Dao].
Returning to the root is called “tranquillity”;
This is called “returning to [natural] destiny”;
“Returning to destiny” is called “enduring” [Dao].
To know the enduring is called “enlightenment.”[181]
The goal is to deconstruct the “Ten Thousand Things” from fixation on the determining mind and “return to the root,” which is an understanding of the “enduring” or sustainability. Yet, study after study, interpretation and commentaries alike, attempt to provide certain fixed principles for the Laozi, either metaphysical, epistemological, ethical, and political, which hinder and obstruct the deconstructive value of the text.[182] Perhaps that is why Zhuangzi did not provide a certain direction and decided to focus his work on deconstruction, particularly deconstruction of self through his usage of image-forming literature.
Zhuangzi’s primary tool of choice is his poetic prose employing stories, metaphor, myth, humor, word play, and rhetoric—the full spectrum of image-forming literature—that allows the reader to eliminate the dualistic determining mind and relieve “the systematic character of our thinking grown into an atmosphere in which our discernment breathes its life. It is a spontaneous philosophizing of the concrete, a subtle weaving of philosophical montage under life’s bewildering implications.”[183] Wu supports the notion that Zhuangzi’s method incites the reader to participate in life’s spontaneity (zi-ran). One example mentioned by Wu is prevalent in the Zhuangzi involves the notions of non-doing (wu-wei) and the usefulness of the useless. Wu states that the notions non-doing and the usefulness of the useless proclaim “Reverse your perspective; see the other side. Negate what you negated. Then you will see that a negated twice becomes a rendered flexible, cautious, and alive. In this manner, the very meaning structure of a notion comes alive, soaring, roaming.”[184] Although Wu does not call these uses “deconstructive,” we can discern a deconstructive resonance. For example, in his second chapter, Zhuangzi seems to be advocating deconstructive strategies in his discussion on the recognition (determinations) of “this” and “that” and how a sage or an authentic person (zhenren) would deal with the determinations:
He [the sage] too recognizes a ‘this’ but a ‘this which is also ‘that,’ a ‘that’ which is also ‘this.’ His ‘that’ has both a right and a wrong in it; his ‘this’ too has both a right and a wrong in it. So, in fact, does he still have a ‘this’ and ‘that?’ A state in which ‘this’ and ‘that’ no longer find their opposites is called the hinge to the Way. When the hinge is fitted into the socket, it can respond endlessly. Its right then is a single endlessness [under erasure] and its wrong too is a single endlessness. So I say, the best thing to use is clarity [transformed mindedness].[185]
The metaphor of the endlessly responsive hinge gives me the impression that Zhuangzi is saying that awareness of the state of deconstruction brings a natural end of reconstruction, so the conventional existence of things is more harmoniously participatory. Or as Wu would put it, existence is “alive.”[186]
When one participates in life “soaring and roaming,” the notion of self seems to disappear. Throughout Wu’s book, the term “self” refers to the subject’s participating in life’s playful “wanderings”; promoting is the forgetting of the self. Discord occurs when an interpretation of “forgetting” gets confused with “elimination” as Youru Wang clarifies:
Zhuangzi plainly states, however, that forgetting self is not an annihilation of conventional self, but merely a radical transformation of the latter. Transcending the distinction of self and other does not mean abandoning the world and socio-individual life, but rather makes one open to the dynamic relationship of self-other, to the relativity and mutual involvement of self and other, and to the infinite transformations of the world.[187]
It is always important to elucidate that deconstruction, in a Derridean sense, or in any Asian sense, does not attempt to eliminate our “self” or alienate the self by removal to some other-worldly place, away from the mundane world. In Zhuangzi’s case, his deconstructive endeavor is not negative in any sense. Rather, it affirms the inevitability of dealing with it and moving on towards something that is “unconditioned, affirmable, and
unquestionable.”[188] In affirmation, there is the sense of “returning to the root”[189] to the mundane world while seeing it “under erasure” in a Derridean sense. As Wu affirms, “Chuang Tzu admitted that conveyance must go on, for without saying something, what is beyond expression can never be conveyed. In this manner silence and speech mingle, and in their mutual weaving appears the sub-texture that is beyond and within both the words and silence, the living truth of things.”[190] In chapter 5 of the Zhuangzi, Zhuangzi states, “To know what you can’t do anything about, and to be content with it as you would with fate—only a man of virtue can do that.”[191]
As these commentators have observed, the Daoism of Laozi and Zhuangzi contains inherently deconstructive qualities. In the Neo-Daoist movement (3rd century A.D), Guo Xiang championed the view of Zhuangzi, further developing and promoting the notion of spontaneity (zi-ran) within the world. The development of spontaneity and the deconstructive process to elicit spontaneity continued down through the emergence of Buddhism in China
It is important to note from this brief exposition into Daoist deconstruction that it is consistent with both Derrida’s original intention and with the general development of Asian deconstruction. The latter expands the enterprise in terms of compassionate edification, the intention of eliminating the calculating intellect (zhi), consideration for the mental/spiritual capacity or level of the practitioner and the use of skillful means (upāya) for liberation, and in Daoism, the integration of image-forming literature into deconstruction.
Robert Allison claims that the only deconstruction that is apt to eliminate the determining mind is image-forming literature. Accordingly, he promotes the Daoist’s poetic deconstruction as the exemplary method, stating, “The only means of bridging the subject-object divide is through the use of poetic language. When poetic language is utilized properly, subject-object language is obviated or at least ‘forgotten.’ It is only possible to transcend paradox through the use of poetry.”[192] In order for the deconstructive process to be more sustainable, claims such as Allison’s need to be avoided because such claims revert back to a determination-creating mode of thought that ultimately have no meaning. The image-forming techniques of the Daoists sages and the later Chan/Zen Buddhists are effective tools for integration in the deconstructive enterprise. However, they do not exhaust the possible tools that could be equally effective.
Furthermore, Allison’s claim that Daoist philosophy, specifically, Zhuangzi’s philosophy, promotes only an image-forming deconstruction is questionable. In the Zhuangzi, the character of Hui Shi, usually assumed to portray a rational/logical sophist or philosopher, plays an integral role in the text. Lisa Raphals has noted that the logical or lexico-grammatical dialogue between Zhuangzi and Hui Shi, in the Zhuangzi and in other texts, reflects the development of Zhuangzi’s philosophy: “When Hui Shi died, Zhuangzi, by his own account, had no one with whom to talk things over.”[193] Raphals’ research on the subject sheds valuable light on the notion that Zhuangzi only promotes image-forming deconstruction because it illustrates the importance of logical or lexico-grammatical dialogue in his philosophy. This implies that Daoism does not promote the distrust of text, but rather showing various levels in which language can be used.
Charles Wei-Hsun Fu (1933-1996) examines the use of language in Daoism in terms of hierarchy of language (ten levels).[194] At the lowest level of the hierarchy, Fu explains that the conventional usage of image-forming literature allows humans to portray or express the meaning of Dao, although it may be open for misinterpretations or can be “misleading.”[195] As we move to the higher levels, the hierarchy goes through the language of common “folk,” epistemic thinkers, and metaphysical—or what he calls onto-theo-logical—thinkers, until it reaches the fifth level of “paradoxical speech” or “goblet words”—reflecting deconstruction. At this level, “paradoxical” image-forming literature is used “in order to liberate us humans from any fixation of language in relation to the fixation of thought and reality.”[196] From this point onwards, the linguistic levels utilize the expansiveness of image-forming literature, including symbols to deconstruct even image-forming literature itself. Ultimately, language reaches a level, not of elimination but of what Fu describes as follows: “Only the Unnameable or Untaoable itself remains. Nothing can be said, even Heidegger’s tautology ‘Language speaks’ is superfluous,[197] for Tao—not language—taos
The Deconstructive Amalgamation
The main purpose of presenting the various philosophers and philosophies as well as the commentators is to develop an expanded version of Derrida’s deconstruction without losing any of his original intentions. First, I laid the groundwork by presenting Derrida’s intention and meaning of “deconstruction” in his letter to Professor Izutsu. Then, I presented the how—the actual way that Derrida presents his deconstructive critique—via comparative commentators. With this broader understanding of Derrida’s deconstruction, I continued to expand the deconstructive enterprise by including various contributions from Asian forms of deconstruction.
Nāgārjuna’s prasańga paved the way for the development of deconstruction throughout Asia . Based on the various studies of the commentators mentioned above, I illustrated the development of deconstruction as it expanded to integrate more qualities and tools. The Asian contributions expanded the deconstructive enterprise by adding:
· A greater sense of purpose by means of soteriological involvement (Seng-Zhao).[199]
· A three-fold deconstruction that allows deconstruction to play a compassionate role of edification in liberating the dichotomizing mind (Jizang).
· Compassionate consideration for the mental/spiritual capacity or level of the practitioner and the use of skillful means (upāya) for liberation (Tsong kha pa and the Lotus Sūtra).
· The importance of image-forming literature (poems, metaphor, stories/myths, rhetoric, comedy, symbolism, etc.) as a deconstructive tool (Dōgen, in Zen/Chan Buddhism and Daoism[200]).
· Use of various levels of language (Daoist language) to assist the deconstructive enterprise in an upāyic way.
This exposition and incorporation of deconstruction is by no means a complete or exhaustive account of the expansiveness of deconstruction. This amalgamation was presented to show how deconstruction is not only flexible and expansive but also consistent and sustainable. By incorporating the Asian approaches into Derrida’s deconstruction, a more expansive, comprehensive deconstructive enterprise results, going beyond both Derridean and Asian deconstruction. With such an expansive and comprehensive method for the liberation of static dichotomizing thinking to a more transcendental minding, deconstruction seems to be a powerful tool for addressing the world’s problems. The focus shifts from trying to fix the world’s ills through the dialogue of established dogmas or fixed philosophical viewpoints. Deconstruction tackles not the content of the mind but how the mind is minding, and it attempts radically to transform into a minding.
The Problem of Deconstruction as a Method
I next want to address the claim by Derrida that deconstruction is not a method nor can it be one. I take the liberty to approach this issue through creative hermeneutics, and perhaps this methodology can be seen to resonate with the intention of Derrida’s project.
The five-stage model of Creative Hermeneutics was developed by Fu to expand further the meaning and intention of original texts so that they can be applied to current and future contexts. Wawrytko states that the term “‘hermeneutics,’ given its derivation from the Greek messenger god Hermes, implies that as a creative component of text and meaning, those who participate in the interpretation of these texts become messengers and “co-creators with the authors, a critical inheritor of their message.”[201] The five-stage process examines the following questions in turn:
1. What did p (philosopher or a given philosophy) say?
2. What did p really intend to say in what he actually said?
3. What could p say in what he did and intended to say?
4. What should p say despite what he did, intended to and could say?
I will approach Derrida’s claim that deconstruction cannot be a method by this five-step hermeneutic. The first stage, what were the actual words or text of Derrida, has been discussed above via the letter to Professor Izutsu. Derrida rejects the possibility of deconstruction’s being a process and asserts that deconstruction is some sort of state that “takes place.” However, as already noted, Derrida also comments that deconstruction “delimits,” implying some activity or process of delimiting or demonstrating limitations. In order to resolve this conflict, the second stage of creative hermeneutics was presented by examining Derrida’s intentions and meanings.
Derrida’s project is to expose the meaninglessness of text or the inability of text to provide any transcendental significance. He exposes this issue through deconstruction. However, ultimately, Derrida is not only expressing that text is delimiting but also that the process of delimitation itself needs to be delimited so that we can transform our way of thinking about reality. Derrida expresses this awareness of the way our mind works and this shows that deconstruction is some sort of unavoidable state, which can be seen under a different perspective, “under erasure.” In the letter to Professor Izutsu, Derrida hopes that Izutsu will find a better term that will “lead elsewhere” beyond what is written and transcribed. As Mabbett observed, “Derrida is therefore seeking to elicit a sense of reality that always steps aside from itself. One cannot speak of it, but one can point to the conceptual space it occupies that constitutes the condition of speaking about it, the possibility of a quest.”[203] Katz agrees: “Derrida maintains that language is not an evoking of a naïve presence, but that it curiously negates presence in order to re-present […]. Lacking the anchor of simple referents, the reader is adrift.”[204] It would be a mistake to interpret Derrida’s intention as only exposing the delimiting nature of deconstruction without noticing his “quest” to transcend the deconstructive cycle.
The third stage of creative hermeneutics asks “what could [Derrida] have meant to say […]. A comparative study of texts or translations must be undertaken.”[205] To approach this stage, we can refer back to the comparative treatment of Derrida’s deconstruction by the commentators presented above. As Derrida states, there is a debate about whether deconstruction is a method or a state, which is exactly the case with our commentators. Fox understands Derrida’s deconstruction as “a critical technique which addresses presuppositions.”[206] For Cai, Derrida’s deconstructive “word play” involves “textual practices.”[207] Cheng states that Derrida’s deconstruction is similar to that of Guo Xian, Laozi and Zhuangzi in “that they all emphasize process rather than end.”[208] Berkson states, “Derrida does not provide a reading of a text, but rather a method or process of reading that ensures that no single reading can ever emerge.”[209] The notion of restructuring text “under erasure” is addressed by Katz in regards to the deconstruction of Mādhyamaka Buddhism; Katz states, “Since yānas cannot be established on the basis of wisdom or goal, their distinction is a pragmatic, pedagogic one. It is as though Tsong kha pa, having negated yānas, continues to use the term ‘under erasure.’ So pervasive is the Mādhyamaka [deconstructive] dialectic throughout his writings that each time the negated term reappears, it is as though crossed over: yāna becomes as a methodical instrument.”[210] Matilal addresses this issue by calling the process of placing text “under erasure” as a “method” that is “explicitly therapeutic.”[211]
On the other hand, two commentators discuss deconstruction as a “state.” Mabbett states,
Deconstruction, it has been said, is simply what is the case. If this is true, we must remember that (according to the deconstructionist approach) ‘what is the case’ is not a given reality, eternally different from specific alternatives that are not the case […]. But what sort of thing can deconstruction really be? It is not even a method, because, after all, methods use tools, which are real, solid entities, on the same plane of reality as the thing upon which they are used, and different from them. Deconstruction, however, has no existence as an activity separate from the phenomena whose nature it recognizes, which it deconstructs. It is a nonthing in itself.[212]
In addressing the image-forming deconstruction presented by Dōgen as opposed to Nāgārjuna’s form, Loy states, “The latter [Dōgen’s] shows that words and metaphors can be understood not just as instrumentality trying to grasp and convey truth (and therefore dualistically interfering with our realization of some truth that transcends words), but as being the truth—that is, as being one of the many ways the Buddha-nature is.”[213] Although Loy is referring to Dōgen’s form of deconstruction, the resonance between Derrida and Dōgen is considerable. To clarify, the statement “deconstruction is a state” does not seem to indicate what Derrida is promoting: “All sentences of the type ‘deconstruction is X’ or ‘deconstruction is not X’ a priori miss the point, which is to say that they are at least false.”[214] Instead the notion of a state should be considered as the activity of deconstruction, deconstructing.
Ultimately, Derrida believes that the state of deconstruction “is taking place” and hopes that a transcendental awareness beyond that state can be achieved. However, the fact that his skeptical critique addresses the issues of logocentrism with some sort of deconstructive activity cannot be ignored. We can grant Derrida’s assertion that deconstruction lies in some “sense of reality,” as Mabbett refers to it. However, given the fact that Derrida “employs a special type of contemplative thought,”[215] such employment cannot be taken for granted. What does “delimiting” or “employment” connote if not some sort of activity towards a certain goal—a method? Should we take the fact that deconstruction was of some service to delimit “highly determined situations” as purely a happenstance and that someone like Derrida undertook the project to delimit and expose those determined situations as coincidental? No other of our commentators addresses this issue, yet the issue of deciphering what does “delimiting” stand for is crucial to Derrida’s critique. Perhaps Derrida was in fact part of the iconoclastic movement in France that challenged all traditional structures, as Berkson points out, and his rebellion on Structuralism was expressed deconstructively. Perhaps his disregard for fixed or static structures and systems with fixed rules and guidelines prevented him from promoting method. The fact that he undertook an examination of the activity of deconstruction nevertheless implies that the activity has some merit or is worthwhile.
In stage four of creative hermeneutics, the goal is to examine and “edit” the notions being studied to express “the most effective means of delivering the intended message”[216] If Derrida intended the state of deconstruction to expose some “highly determined situations” and hoped that the “service” might lead towards something beyond the logos, the most effective way to do that is through the activity of deconstruction itself, “under erasure.” If we examine his notion of “deconstructing, deconstruction” or “double séance,” what Mabbett calls a “double affirmation,” there seems to be a two-fold element to deconstruction. The disjuncture between the method/state debate seems to be resolved by the interpretation of a two-fold deconstructive enterprise. Derrida should not have rejected method but should have valued its activity within the being of deconstruction and nurtured the natural occurrence to do more “service.” As Derrida asserts, the dialectic between the binary opposites is unavoidable. If they are not avoidable, why not return to them “under erasure” and utilize the system for a greater good? Derrida’s disinterest in deconstruction’s possible pedagogical effectiveness also narrowed or obscured his effort to transcend the state of deconstruction through a different type of minding. Berkson states that Derrida’s deconstruction only “leaves us playing in a set of signifiers.”[217] What Derrida should have done was to continue to examine the state of deconstruction and figure out how to transcend it.
The last stage of creative hermeneutics issues a claim about what must be said in the context of the present situation.[218] Derridean deconstruction sets the stage in the Americo-European environment to deal with static and dogmatic issues. Unfortunately, although he made a muted plea to find a transcendental “escape” from the “eternal” deconstructive recurrence, his narrow strategy of only affirming deconstruction did not allow him to tackle greater, more global issues related to the real human spirit—to humanity.[219] His focus on and skepticism of the linguistic-grammatical “situation,” similar to that of Nāgārjuna, did not allow him to transcend the two-fold deconstruction “reality.” The difference between Derridean and Nāgārjunan deconstruction is that Nāgārjuna did have a humanistic goal transmitted from the time of the Buddha himself—to eliminate suffering. Unfortunately for Nāgārjuna, this goal got obscured by the many interpreters who valued the method and not the goal itself.
The deconstructive enterprise, however, does not end with the Derridean view. We have seen that deconstruction is nothing new. Many Asian traditions have followed similar methods and affirmed such states. The main contribution of this section was to demonstrate how the Asian form of deconstruction can expand the deconstructive enterprise to include: (1) the goal to liberate people from bondage and suffering; (2) a third dimension—a pedagogical, edifying, or therapeutic dimension which automatically consisting of method. The two-fold characteristic of Derrida’s deconstruction consists of exposing and affirming the nature of opposing binaries and exposing the nature of deconstruction itself. By having a “soteriological” goal, the deconstructed mind returns to the world of binary oppositions and helps minds to deconstruct that delusion. This implies that the mind is already in a transcendental minding, free from the state of deconstruction to intermingle or play within the dichotomizing world; (3) deconstruction in this sense needs to be expansive and comprehensive enough to liberate as many people as possible. Therefore, the compassionate deconstructionist needs not only to have the ability to play within the dichotomizing world but has to have the wisdom to decipher the mental/spiritual level of those being approached and determine what type of deconstruction applies using as many deconstructive tools as possible to treat the “illness”; (4) lastly, image-forming and other linguistic tools, such as the levels of Daoist language, expand the effectiveness of the deconstructive enterprise.
This expanded notion of deconstruction is an adequate method for developing a global philosophy.
Prologue for Further Discussion
Since the deconstructive enterprise is nothing new, it is interesting that the Amero-European traditions have not followed the phenomenology of deconstruction to its natural “end.” Some philosophers have used similar methodologies (not termed “deconstruction” but involving similar mental activities) but either hesitate to continue to pursue them and their corresponding revelations or revert back to the logosphere once the deconstruction has led them to their prearranged goal. The following is a very brief and preliminary review of some philosophers who resonate with the deconstructive enterprise. The purpose here is to note how the deconstructive enterprise has been “active” within the Americo-European tradition while still being generally ignored as a viable and noteworthy source of higher wisdom. In addition, this may initiate a dialogue for re-examining these philosophers. Perhaps, there is yet more to learn from what seems to be a stagnant tradition.
Starting from Greek times, the Socratic method of elenchus was studied for its deconstructive nature. Practicing Socratic Ignorance, Socrates avoided any determination of the world without having a sense of inner wisdom—intuitive or transcendental wisdom. In the Phaedrus, Socrates states, “I am not yet able [...] to know myself and so it seems ridiculous to me, who does not even know this, to inquire into irrelevant matters. And dismiss all these and, following the customary belief about them, reflect not on these but on myself.”[220] Socrates believed that most people follow determinations of the world blindly. These kinds of static doxastic systems can be easily confronted and contradicted. In fact, the sophists made a living doing just that. Cushman describes Socrates’ efforts as a way for humans to alleviate the misery of their “contradictory existence.”[221] From this standpoint, he compassionately reaches out to people, attempting to expose the delusional world through his process of elenchus. This was a process of sustained questioning without providing absolute accounts or determined claims. Cushman states, “For Socrates, the aim of teaching was not what he could impart of truth but what truth he could induce others to apprehend as their own discovery.”[222] As the process of inquiry continued, elenchus inspires the participant towards a transformed type of minding beyond conceptual—textual—creation. Cushman affirms this process stating, “The dialogues [Republic, Timaeus, Theaetetus] clearly indicate that catharsis (transformation) which, on its negative side, is a cleansing and emptying, is, on its positive side, a repletion in goodness and virtue (true nature).”[223] Needleman agrees: “Socrates represents a higher level of the mind; not a higher system of concepts, but the activation of a different energy within human nature.”[224] That different energy that does not re-create dichotomizing thought brings a sense of the inner-self or the heart/mind (daimon) being fulfilled and in harmony (eudaimonia). This type of harmony is what Socrates considered the “good.” Versenyi elaborates:
The good is what fulfills one’s nature, and the fulfillment of one’s nature, the realization of one’s proper potential is the natural aim of human life. The Socratic name for this self-fulfillment is eu-daimonia, the activity or state in which all is well with one’s daimon (lot, portion, nature), in which one’s daimon is well arranged, one’s constitution is as it ought to be, in which one has become what, by nature, one had to be, needed to be. Our word for eudaimonia is happiness.[225]
The Socratic method of elenchus is generally credited with starting the development of rational thought. Perhaps if we re-examine the texts associated with Socrates and Plato, we might shed fresh light into on the Socratic opus.
In early modern philosophy, Spinoza is considered to be one of the pioneers of the scientific or rational method of philosophy due to his logico-geometric method, especially in the Ethics.[226] Spinoza applies a very logical and geometrical structure to explain how it is that we are causally connected with substance (the wholeness of reality) in parts I and II of his Ethics. What I consider to be one of his main set of propositions is found in Part I; it begins the delimiting of rational, discursive, or determining thought. Spinoza states that “a certain thing must have been produced by substance immediately, namely those which follow necessarily from [substance’s] absolute nature.”[227] He then claims that if we are going to understand or “grasp” substance intellectually, that is, through a certain mode of thinking that is not the absolute thought or what I call transcendental minding,[228] our intellect can only understand the attributes of substance and the modes of affection “and nothing else.”[229] This shows that as a mere mode of thought and not absolute thought, the discursive intellect was limitated to understanding substance through determined attributes or determined modes or affections, what Spinoza refers to as “manifestations” of substance. In Part II, Spinoza states, “It is of the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain species of eternity.”[230] This “certain species” is what I consider to be a conceptual mode or determination of eternity. Again, in this claim, Spinoza is implying that reason can only understand things under a conceptual or “species” of substance. As Spinoza provides an extensive account of the causal connections of body elements and mind elements to substance and the rational capacity to understand those elements, Spinoza seems to be providing not a “positive” account of the capacity of reason to comprehend substance but rather a “negative” account —exposing the limitations—of reason. This is due to Spinoza’s claims that substance is infinite and eternal—beyond spatio-temporal or determined distinctions or concepts. Since substance is beyond any concepts of eternity, infinitude, or any quality, concepts such as “causal connections” or subject-object/mind-body distinctions only hinder the process of absolute thought or “intellectual intuition” which we necessarily inherit.
This delimiting process treats passions and emotions in the same manner in Part III. Spinoza states that certain feelings and emotions are misunderstood, i.e., inadequate ideas rely on a false perception of the affections of exterior things (passions).[231] In order to escape the delimitations of our discursive intellect, Spinoza instructs us to understand things adequately so that we can act on what would benefit our perseverance (conatus).[232] Therefore, our highest virtue—our highest activity—is to understand or mind substance.[233] In Part V, Spinoza designates third kind of knowledge—intuition (the second kind of knowledge being the discursive intellect)[234]—as having the ability to understand substance and professes that the highest endeavor and virtue of our mind is to understand substance, attaining the transcendental minding, the “intellectual love of substance.”[235] In this brief summary of Spinoza’s process, we can notice parallels to deconstruction by showing the limitations and misconceptions of our rational and emotional ways of thinking. He presents an “ethics” that points towards liberation from the bondage of mere modes of thought to absolute thought of the intellectual love of substance. However, Spinoza is generally not understood in this manner due, for the most part, because of his deep logico-geometrico-rational account of substance. Fu agrees, saying that Spinoza made a mistake in his attempt to explain substance. By placing the explanation of substance under the rational umbrella and not liberating it from conceptual thinking, it “is hypostatically iced in a logico-geometrical framework:”[236]
For instance, Spinoza’s idea of God as substance is originally constructed through his unique personal realization of nature as the ontological oneness of all things; and yet by setting up a conceptual/propositional framework he traps himself into an unnecessary and tautological ‘proof’ of the ‘existence’ of God in the Proposition XI, Part I, of his Ethics.[237]
How would modern philosophy treat Spinoza if he had introduced another way of minding? What would be the implications if the deconstructive enterprise were attributed to his philosophy? Can we connect deconstruction to his work, if not implicitly, through creative hermeneutics? Such questions are not too absurd to start asking.
Presently, I am researching claims that even the Copernican revolutionary of rational thought proposed by Kant has methodological parallels to deconstruction. Kant’s explanation of noumenon goes hand-in-hand with his explanation of phenomenon and, thereby, the rest of his Transcendental Doctrine. However, Kant’s description of noumenon was treated in two ways. To complicate further the matter, this two-fold description also is explained in two different ways by Kant.[238] These two ways can be easily resolved by simply explaining them. One way can be addressed by naming the two different terms used (noumenon vs. transcendental object); the other way is by categorizing noumenon into positive and negative “senses.”
Explaining the two-fold noumenon itself is quite a different scenario. While one side of the noumenon “coin” (either the transcendental object or the noumenon in a negative sense) is directly involved with our entire system of understanding—the transcendental aesthetic and analytic—the other side of the coin (either the noumenon or the noumenon in a positive sense) is discarded as unknowable and beyond our capacity to think about it.
Why does Kant favor one side over the other? It has to do with his stance on the limitation of our rational thought/mind. Kant believes that our capacity to understand the world only goes as far as experiencing it sensibly, through the appearance of the world and non-sensibly, only through the a conceptual understanding that allows the sensible to be thought. Kant believes that the mind does not have the capacity to think beyond these two conceptual dichotomies. Only a mind that has an intellectual intuition (such as God’s) has the capacity to understand the world as it really is.[239]
The main question to be posed is whether there can be room to know beyond the conceptual dichotomies and possibly attain some sort of intellectual intuition. The deconstructive enterprise resembles Kant’s extensive intention and process of abstraction that “deconstructs” the empirical appearances to get to the rudimentary forms of our functioning mind.[240] In terms of his explanation of the negative sense of noumenon, his abstraction process leads him to the formal structure of our conceptual functionality by providing an explanation of how we understand the world (through the formal structures of the transcendental aesthetic and analytic) and how far we can go with our understanding (through the conceptual ability to think of the suprasensible—the transcendental object). His abstraction process could have gone further. The deconstruction enterprise shows a possible way of abstracting the dichotomy created altogether, that is, the dichotomy of sensible/non-sensible (noumenon in a negative sense) qualities of understanding.
By eliminating the dichotomy, it is possible to see the world “noumenonally” (in the positive sense). Furthermore, the deconstructive process can abstract the dichotomy of the two-fold noumenon altogether, leaving only that which can be intellectually intuited (transcendental minding). If deconstruction is able to furnish such possibilities, then Kant’s abstraction process could bare similar fruits. If Kant would have continued with his abstraction process, instead of stopping once his “formal structures” were laid-out, perhaps it would have led him to realize that intellectual intuition is possible.
Since Derrida mentions Nietzsche and Heidegger in his “Letter to a Japanese Friend,” from its inception, Derrida’s deconstruction has traces of Nietzschean and Heideggerian philosophy. What do these philosophers have to contribute to the deconstructive enterprise? Martin compares Nāgārjuna and Nietzsche and finds that in Nietzsche’s philosophy, “a deconstructive process ultimately leads to the realization that both everyday existence and the categories by which we comprehend it are self-contradictory and incoherent.”[241] Heidegger’s notion of Destruktion was Derrida’s precursor to his own development of deconstruction. How did Heidegger’s deconstruction of metaphysics differ? Can Heidegger’s notions add to the deconstructive enterprise?
Lastly, other Amero-European philosophers do have traces of deconstruction within their philosophical thought. Philip J. Ivanhoe and Karen L. Carr attribute “anti-rationalistic” traits to Kierkegaard.[242] Anti-rationalism is defined as:
Antirationalism is a philosophical position about how one grounds certain kinds of truth claims, particularly those concerned with establishing the proper ends of human life. While antirationalism does not deny the value of reason even in his project, it denies that reason alone will enable one to chose and pursue the proper goal of life. Antirationalists believe in alternative sources of guidance. They maintain that we have a tendency to place too much trust in abstract, apersonal forms of reasoning and that this leads us to lose contact with these important, alternative sources of wisdom. Our excessive trust in reason thus hinders our ability to see things as they really are and to act properly and effectively in the world.[243]
Anti-rationlism can be considered a deconstructive endeavor to delimit our assumption that reason is a sufficient tool to acquire wisdom. Wittgenstein’s distrust of language, Humean skepticism, and Cartesian meditation can all be studied for deconstructive traits.
This thesis only dealt with deconstruction in relation to language and the many forms of linguistic expression. As Krishnamurti, Fu, and many other philosophers suggest, to attain intelligence requires a direct link to silence or linguistic stillness.[244] Deconstruction, before it is cast away, can also play an edifying role through non-language practices in the arts (such as the performing arts—dance—and craft making); meditation (such as Zen meditative practices); certain physical exercises (such as extreme sports or high-level skilled play); and even mundane activities (such as watering the grass or other repetitive work). As long as the underlying intention is compassionately to liberate our minds from the bondage of static thinking, the method of deconstruction can be found in virtually any human endeavor.
This brief arrangement of various philosophers who have traces of deconstruction within their method was presented to raise awareness of the abundant use of deconstruction within the Americo-European tradition. Moreover, it may elicit a re-examination of those works to see if they can be added to the already ample and expansive deconstructive enterprise, thereby furthering establishment of a sustainable method that will elicit a transformed way of minding in a global atmosphere.
Chapter 4
As the world becomes more globally aware due to technological advances of the internet, mass media, and transportation, the issue of human understanding has greater importance. Bahm states, “The danger of human extinction by suicidal wars include antipathies due to misunderstandings, some of them culturally induced.”[245] Dogmatic, ideological, philosophical and socio-cultural misunderstandings seem to be the “root of all evil,” and there does not seem to be a way to figure out what to do about the misunderstandings and human suffering. Many through the ages have approached the problem and have had some level of success, but the same problem of misunderstandings rears its ugly head. At present, due to our effectiveness in creating weapons of mass destruction, understanding is critical to human survival. As Galik states,
After the two ‘small boys’ fell over Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 8, 1945, and two planes crushed the ‘twins’ in New York on September 11, 2001, we have no other choice than to proceed with the intercultural, interphilosophical, and interreligious dialogue, communicate more with each other, and gradually, step by step, try to achieve mutual understanding between nations, nationalities, different societies, and social groups of the world.[246]
One can envision that the advances in tele-communication and the worldwide web can assist the endeavor to eliminate ignorance and static dogmatic beliefs. Instead, these technological advances have hindered the project by disclosing an extremely superficial outlook on people and the world and obstruct us from connecting with people’s minds. Shallow understandings have now multiplied and are being embraced as truths and reality.
Historically, philosophy has been the “first-responders” in the world’s crises. Galik declares that the philosophy of the future “should draw from the lessons of the intercultural communication in multicultural communities (or commonwealths) of our time and devote more attention to the methods of effective communication and gradual understanding, which is a condition sine qua non for the survival and possible advance of our civilization and culture.”[247] Some philosophers and philosophical movements endeavored to deal with world philosophical issues through finding methods of “effective communication and gradual understanding,” the most noteworthy work coming from Hawaii
Since the days of ancient Greece for the Amero-European tradition, the Hindi-influenced Buddhist school of Abhidhārma
In order for philosophers to solve the world’s larger problems, global philosophy must be revolutionary, not fixated on traditional practices for generating philosophical insights. Instead, we must change the focus from studying the “forms” or the theoretical, systematic constructions of philosophical issues to a meditation on the way in which our mind comports itself when dealing with humanity’s issues. Hence global philosophy, to be sustainable and worthwhile, must be an activity of the mind (minding) reaching out to the world’s problems and to the human conditions, not to a particular concept or theoretical structure. The demand for a transcendental shift or a revolutionary transformation in our philosophical approach is being shared in present discussions such as the graduate conference at the University of Hawaii
What is philosophy? What is its purpose? Philosophy is recognized as the love of wisdom. What does it mean to be wise? Schmidtt explains that the attainment of wisdom is intended “not just to learn and assimilate a doctrine. To acquire wisdom is to learn to be wise, and to do so is to change one’s way of life and to change oneself. To teach wisdom is to change persons. […] Wisdom is intimately tied to individuals.”[249] The most meaningful characteristic of philosophy is its inherit intention to compassionately reach-out and “inter-mind”—inter-involvement, disclosing the way we think—with others. The wisest personalities attempted to clarify each other’s highest consciousness and awareness. Khatchadourian states, “The lover of wisdom in our sense strives to attain a comprehensive and progressively more adequate understanding of the human condition as a whole and its multifarious manifestations and expressions in the unfolding drama of human history.”[250] In this sense, philosophy is an activity of the mind, reaching, disclosing, and returning again with a higher order consciousness. Philosophy, as presently understood, does not share the same intentions or qualities.
Philosophy has ossified into a study of structures, theories, and systems. It has narrowed its scope and its out reach, becoming a troll under a bridge not often crossed, tackling questions that most of humanity no longer has interest in. Solomon shares his concerns:
The problem, as I have argued in my recent book, The Joy of Philosophy, is the way contemporary philosophy has rendered itself so ‘thin,’ cutting itself off from context, history, and culture. The philosophical games based on dubious notions of ‘logical possibility’ and the continuing insistence on necessary and sufficient conditions, giving rise inevitably to the counterexample contest, have been undermined by recent work in the philosophy of language. It is easy enough to appreciate why young philosophers continue to be enticed to join in such games, but few people outside academic philosophy departments find anything of interest or significance in them. Moreover, the compulsive nature of the games distracts us from confronting the problems that so-called real people face in their lives. How many more centuries are we to watch some of our brightest young minds lose themselves in ‘internalism-externalism,’ ‘realism-antirealism’ debates? [My emphasis.][251]
Solomon suggests that to alleviate this problem, what is considered as philosophy needs to be “seriously revised” and that other philosophical practices, such as methapor, myth, image-forming literature outside the Amero-Eurocentric arena need to be recognized as “legitimate modes of philosophizing.”[252] Comparative philosophy is one solution to the problem, examining the principles and doctrines of Asian traditions and comparing them to the specific philosophy one champions. However, as Henkel suggests and this thesis claims, the comparative format is “guaranteed to fail” unless philosophy itself transforms from content-centric studies to studies of how it is that our mind reaches out and interacts with other minds to attain higher order awareness. By reaching out, the mind centers its attention on the entirety of the human condition, not on the static knowledge-bank accumulated throughout history that is hindering fresh, creative, “alive”[253] co-existence. Krishnamurti states, “Attention is a state in which the mind is ever learning without a center around which knowledge gathers as accumulated experience. A mind that is concentrated upon itself uses knowledge as a means of its own expansion; and such activity becomes self-contradictory and anti-social […]. Right thinking can come about only when the mind is not enslaved by tradition and memory. It is attention that allows silence to come upon the mind, which is the opening of the door to creation.”[254] For Galik, “the philosophy of our day needs to show us how to live in this world of ours, and concretely how to live together not only in our families and small circles where we stay and work but also in our countries, among the nation and national minorities, even in the whole globalized world.”[255]
Will philosophical practice continue to “chase its own theoretical tail” or will it transform into a practice that is “alive” and that transcends mere discursivness? Khatchadourian declares:
In a world increasingly dominated by science and technology, convulsed by repeated violence, plagued by international rivalries and conflicts, and numerous other material, moral and spiritual ills, philosophers cannot afford to be mere spectators from the sidelines. Indeed, as philosophers and not simply as human beings, they have the duty to become more involved or engaged. They must once again regain their heritage as gadflies, intellectual path-finders and pioneers, visionaries, seekers of wisdom.[256]
To revitalize the practice of philosophy and allow it to have a greater role in solving the problems of the world, it needs to transform. However, hundreds of years of conditioning are hard to de-condition. Stuart Holroyd’s analysis of the parallels between David Bohm (an accomplished physicist) and Krishnamurti notes that both Bohm and Krishnamurti share the belief that “our awareness has to be not only of what we think about the world but also how we think about it, and the latter is the more difficult, for it is easier for us to accept that the outputs of our thinking processes may be fallible or provisional than the processes themselves.”[257] To prepare the transformation of the mind for a global type of minding—a global philosophy—the philosopher needs initially to be a gadfly, one who provokes and annoys the static type of minding and transforms it into a transcendental type of minding (transformation into Zhuangzi’s butterfly[258]). This thesis suggests a particular methodology, namely deconstruction, that will allow us to function as a gadfly and as a propaedeutic—the preparatory steps—towards this revolutionary global philosophy.
Deconstruction, as it has been defined, is an expansive and effective method that allows the philosopher or the teacher to compassionately reach-out to other minds and attempt to address, expose and remove constructed dogmas, believed to be of absolute “truth,” that are static. Its main contribution to global philosophy is providing therapy for minds that see philosophy and the world as having particular meaningful content and transforming them into a creative activity of co-existence with the world. The method of deconstruction does not provide any one single principle or content that is championed above any other. Instead it utilizes any thought-provoking tool to elicit inner conflict and inner contemplation, thereby avoiding the first condition posited above. Deconstruction avoids all the obstacles because it has no particular view to champion. It is not “the” global philosophy, nor does it explain global philosophy. The method is only utilized as a preparatory treatment of the mind to induce an open activity that addresses global matters in fresh and creative ways.
This therapeutic method of deconstruction can imply a “practical” application that in Chapter Two was considered an obstacle for sustainability (17). Though participatory notions such as “therapy” and “reaching out” seem to imply a “practical” approach or act, we must note that participation is quite distinct from practicality. Participation elicits co-creation and an activity that is happening at the moment. Participation does not call for an alteration of previously established organizations or laws, guidelines, rules, or systems but rather exposes those establishments, thus inciting active co-creativity of reality. A practical approach, as defined above, suggests a call to act out on certain standards that were previously established. Furthermore, the specific critique of “practical” applications was that in such an act, the method is not been critically analyzed and has assumed to be adequate. In the case of the suggested method of deconstruction, an adequate treatment of the method has been presented before suggesting this participatory approach. Lastly, this participatory suggestion is within the framework of method and not a global philosophical theory. The practical application is an obstacle because a practical action is based on a theoretical framework of a global philosophy. The method of deconstruction is not an obstacle because participation is suggested while no significantly meaningful theory of global philosophy is being proposed. Therefore deconstruction also avoids the second condition that mandates against a global philosophy.
The claim that deconstruction does not have content to champion presents a possible objection. The objection can go as follows: Deconstruction challenges the transcendental significance of text; the reason it is skeptic about transcendental significance is because there is a metaphysical presupposition that nothing has transcendental meaning. For deconstruction to deconstruct and empty-out a concept, a meaningful presupposition that there is nothing meaningful needs to be championed. Otherwise, there would be no justification for deconstruction. Therefore, a deconstructive denial of meaningful content itself is contradictory. Dealing with the deconstructive efforts of Zhuangzi, Wang states, “What is the inner connection between Zhuangzi’s thesis—the infinite transformation of things—and his deconstruction […]? First, without his thesis there would be no deconstruction.”[259]
This possible objection to an inherent contradiction actually benefits the deconstruction enterprise. By exposing yet another binary of oppositions, it further justifies the deconstructionist claim that even deconstruction itself is bound to need further deconstruction. Fox addresses this issue by stating, “if one develops a fixation on the language of deconstruction, this language must be further deconstructed.”[260] Derrida professed that deconstruction, as a state, is happening and will always be there; it is unavoidable. The fact that there is an apparent contradiction further exposes such a fact.
One would argue that deconstruction can go into an infinite process of deconstructing deconstruction. Derrida would agree and would have nothing more to add rather than to affirm such a state. However, the deconstruction that has been used in the Asian traditions has an “exit strategy.” In the Mādhyamika tradition, to be attached to the deconstructive method is not fully to understand the goal—to end human suffering. The deconstruction process is utilized to create inner tension, conflict, and doubt. As the understanding of the state of deconstruction is more clearly exposed, the notion of deconstruction has reached its therapeutic goal and is therefore cast-off. Katz states, “To combat the malaise of reification, the Buddha offers a therapy which is not based on naïve counter-claiming [such as deconstruction] but on silencing the very passion for claiming itself.”[261] Deconstruction as a conceptual construction also must be released in order to be “adrift,” floating and playing beyond conceptual constructions. This is one of the key features of the deconstructive enterprise as promoted by the Asian traditions. Martin explains that the goal and force of Nāgārjuna’s deconstruction is having the ability to disclose the “inexpressibility and non-duality of things seen in their immediacy at the point of the groundless-ground prior to thought.”[262]
One last objection can address the inability to express the transcendental idea of spontaneity without the use of concepts and text. If the ultimate level of the mind is not to construct or express, then why does the method of deconstruction do just that? The objection is a reasonable one. Insofar as deconstruction is being used, transcendental minding will not be reached. However, one must always consider the primary goal and intention of utilizing deconstruction. It is not utilized to determine any kind of absolute existence. It is used as a form of compassionate out reach to those who have fixated and conditioned their minds in constant bondage to the suffering of the world. The three-fold deconstructive enterprise provided above deals with this sort of objection. Deconstruction can only be used to liberate the mind. Insofar as this goal is understood, deconstruction can be used, played-with, tinkered with and then released. Zhuangzi frequently uses the notion of the usefulness of the useless to explain that things have significant or meaningful usages as long as it is done to achieve a certain goal and not to hold on to. An exemplary case is found in Chapter 26:
The fish trap exists because of the fish; once you’ve gotten the fish, you can forget the trap. The rabbit snare exists because of the rabbit; once you’ve gotten the rabbit, you can forget the snare. Words exist because of meaning; once you’ve gotten the meaning; you can forget the words. Where can I find a man who has forgotten words so I can have a word with him?[263]
In the case of the deconstructive enterprise, what seems to be useless does have a purpose. As long as it is used to attain the purpose of compassionate out reach, deconstruction can still be used. Once the meaning or purpose is achieved, then deconstruction can be discarded.
The therapeutic or edifying feature of the method of deconstruction is the primary contribution towards the possibility of a global philosophy. To transform our way of looking at the world, we need to be stirred-up, conflicted, and perplexed by philosophical deconstructive gadflies. Philosophers need to come down from Zarathustra’s mountain and re-incite revolution. This type of revolution does not involve a reformation or a restructuring of our knowledge, which would only create other “idols” to which to adhere. The required revolution is a complete change, a transformation in the manner in which we think. As deconstruction is applied, the participant is left without anything meaningful to hold on to, which forces the mind anxiously to co-create its own existence with others and the world. The mind is prepared and ready to deal with global issues because the mind is spontaneously and actively participating in the co-creation of the world. Krishnamurti calls this type of revolution “individual revolution.” Individual revolution occurs only when we are self-aware and we observe the phenomenology of life “as it comes and [only when we] do not avoid disturbances […] we keep intelligence highly awakened […] intelligence highly awakened is intuition, which is the only true guide in life.”[264] This type of intuitive intelligence can only be discoverable “in the relationships of our everyday existence.”[265] As an initial tool for this revolution, the process of deconstruction treats our mind to address our everyday life in a transformed perspective. Berkson states that Zhuangzi’s and Derrida’s deconstruction “puts the reader in the role of producer rather than consumer; the reader uses the text to create meaning, for there is no stable meaning present in the text.”[266] Wu pronounces, “He [Zhuangzi] lets the systematic character of our thinking grow into an atmosphere in which our discernment breathes its life. It is a spontaneous philosophizing of the concrete, a subtle weaving of philosophical montage under (sub-tilis) life’s bewildering implications.”[267]
Deconstruction has various tools to incite inner tension and conflict. The responsibility of the compassionate philosopher is to discern how to apply the expansive range of deconstructive tools to people who have various degrees or levels of mental, spiritual, and intellectual capacity. This implies that the philosopher has the ability to understand the condition of a particular person who is being approached. The highest endeavor of the philosopher—the individual—is to comport his/her mind to be an empty vessel, devoid of any content, so that the mind of another can be disclosed and understood. Holroyd sets forth Krishnamurti’s notion of intelligence eloquently: “True intelligence, then, consists in looking, listening, inquiring and being choicelessly aware. It is a function of the mind that is simple, in the sense that it is uncluttered with convictions, opinions, habits of thinking in terms of measurement or comparison. It is not personal, and it is quite different from thought.”[268] Preparing the mind for such an undertaking requires flexibility and a transcendental way of thinking that the method of deconstruction can assist in revolutionizing.
The static mind, conditioned through knowledge and the blind belief in something transcendentally absolute, needs to be revolutionized into an active and creative minding to address the issues of the world. In doing so, one can approach the human condition, first on a personal level, and then with one individual a time, to co-create the world to alleviate global problems. Krishnamurti states, “True revolution can take place only when you, the individual, becomes aware in your relationship with another.”[269] Global philosophy in its wholeness is inexpressible, but as the initial propaedeutic stage towards global philosophy, deconstruction prepares people to approach each other as through an activity of the mind and not as the sharing of information. There are no misunderstandings because there are no-particular-things, concepts, or theories being shared, only the mutual co-activity between minds in the present. Hence, global philosophy starts with one individual’s reaching out to another with a sustainable mindset: “If there is this true, voluntary revolution on the part of the individual, then you will create the right environment for all, without the distinction of class or race. Then the world will be a single human unit.”[270] The deconstructive enterprise prepares the sustainable environment for such a revolution.
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[1] A simple glimpse into any volume of the journal Philosophy East & West can provide evidence of those contradictions. Specifically, Sandra A. Wawrytko has worked diligently to provide evidence of contradictory generalizations in many of her articles or books. See bibliography.
[2] The term “World Philosophy” will also be briefly mentioned. However, due to some mixed meanings and intentions of the term that will be shown, I will primarily focus on the term “global philosophy.”
[3] Sustainability refers to the capacity to prolong and endure through time, place, and change. To withstand the dynamic currents of the global atmosphere, one must have a clear purpose and strong foundations and demonstrate the potential for longevity in order to present a sustainable global philosophy.
[4] Just turn on the Internet’s MySpace for adequate justification. In MySpace, one of the most popular social networking sites, one can post one’s characteristics and passions on the internet. However, one cannot disclose the deepest or most intimate part, and the most significantly “real” part, of one’s persona in such formats.
[5] Aivaras Stepukonis, “The Idea of a World Philosophy in the East-West Philosophical Context,” Dialogue and Universalism 13, no. 1-2 (2003): 59-70. These phenomena are nothing new. Bahm mentions that using one’s philosophy as the standard is common and sometimes unavoidable. Although, Bahm believes that using one’s own philosophy as the standard is “the most unreliable” method to compare, he still doesn’t eliminate the possibility of it being worthwhile. Archie J. Bahm, Comparative Philosophy: Western, Indian and Chinese Philosophies Compared (Albuquerque: World Books, 1977).
[6] Robert C. Solomon, “What is Philosophy? The Status of World Philosophy,” Philosophy East & West 51, no. 1 (2001): 103. Deutsch also states, “[…] the end of philosophy has been announced in the Anglo-American analytic world by many who now call themselves pragmatists […].” Eliot Deutsch, Persons and Valuable Worlds: A Global Philosophy (Oxford
[7] Stepukonis, 61.
[8] If one were to search on the Philosopher’s Index database, one of the most recognized indexes of philosophy that monitors 550 journals in 40 countries for example, no more than 30 articles are shown of the 400,000 articles in the index since 1940. Philosopher’s Index, (Bowling Green : Philosopher’s Information Center
[9] I will refer to the work of such philosophers because their meaning and intention are the same as the definition of “global philosophy” that is being established.
[10] A book on the history of philosophy can be seen as a world philosophy book if it does indeed encompass world history.
[11] Syed H. Akhter, Global Marketing, (Cincinnati: South-Western College, 1995) and John Naisbitt, Global Paradox (New York: Avon, 1994).
[12] That is not to say that there has not been a study of world philosophies or worldviews before this time. Any civilization that has done any significant exploration, conquest, missionary activities, etc., has done a fair amount of study of that particular region and has compared it to its own worldviews. Bahm states, “Broadly conceived, nothing in philosophy is older than comparative philosophy.” (Bahm, Comparative Philosophy, 3) Bahm ascribes various meanings to the term comparative that will be discussed later. The major difference between the past comparisons and 20th century comparisons is that in the past, the comparisons were done not as an intellectual necessity of empathy but rather to spark self-inquiry, as an expression of fascination or amusement. After the entire world confronted the reality that conflict amongst ideologies discharges a devastating “punch,” the intellectual necessity to understand those ideologies took greater importance. Raju states, “This need to understand is no longer a matter of mere intellectual curiosity but of survival.” P.T. Raju, Introduction to Comparative Philosophy,(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1962), v. Quoted by Bahm, Comparative Philosophy, 13.
[13] By “the comparative movement,” I refer to the intention of various members of the faculty of the University of Hawaii to attempt to compare or integrate philosophies, particularly those of the “East “ and “West.”
[14] Charles A. Moore, as quoted by Stepukonis, 63.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Stepukonis, 64.
[17] Syncretism and synthesis have slightly different meanings. Where syncretism means a reconciliation of different beliefs, synthesis means grouping together various elements or things. Synthesis is a mere grouping together without any sense of reconciliation. Stepukonis defines “syncretism” as a synthesis and seems to use “synthesis” and “syncretic” synonymously. Stepukonis’ explanation of the first method of syncretism connotes both a grouping together and a reconciliation. Since the grouping that Stepukonis defines is a type of reconciliation, syncretism seems to be the a more precise term. Therefore, this paper will use “syncretism” instead of “synthesis.”
[18] Stepukonis, 64.
[19] Finding common ground among Descartes, Bergson, and Derrida, for example.
[20] Stepukonis, 65.
[21] By “practical” I mean the general practical applications of philosophy: politics/civics/policy, law/justice/rights, and ethics/morality/values. Any call for an organizational change or creation, or action to alter rules, guidelines or systems is what I refer to a practical application.
[22] Stepukonis, 65.
[23] Satis Chandra Chatterjee, “The Basis of World Philosophy,” Indian Philosophy & Culture 3 (1958): 197.
[24] More concretely, look at the military support that other “allies” have provided the US efforts in Iraq US US
[25] Oliver L. Reiser, “World Philosophy and the Integration of Knowledge,” Systematics 2, no. 2 (1964): 83-101.
[26] Ibid., 101.
[27] Ibid., 84-89.
[28] Henryk Skolimowski, “Global Philosophy as a Foundation of Global Peace,” Dialectics and Humanism 11 (1984): 406.
[29] He states, “So peace is about wholeness. And wholeness is peace.” Ibid.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid., 408.
[33] Joseph Grange, John Dewey, Confucius, and Global Philosophy (Albany
[34] Roger Ames, Preface to Grange, ix.
[35] Chung-Ying Cheng, in his review of Grange’s book, considers Grange’s efforts not as syncretic but “the finest kind of comparative philosophy” because “[Grange’s efforts] brings them closer together so that a deeper and more synergetic understanding results.” We will see later that Stepukonis defines the comparative method differently. It seems as if Chung-Ying Cheng is using “comparative” as equivalent to “syncretic” method, a definition Stepukonis and I do not accept. Chung-Ying Cheng, “Confucian Ren and Deweyan Experience,” review of John Dewey, Confucius, and The Global Philosophy,” by Joseph Grange, Journal of Chinese Philosophy 32, no. 4 (2005): 644.
[36] Grange, xiv.
[37] Dao is partially covered in Grange’s book. However, it is treated as an experiential phenomenon, which can raise many metaphysical questions that go beyond the purpose of this paper.
[38] Grange, xvii.
[39] Bahm, Comparative Philosophy, 5.
[40] Although comparing all the philosophies of all the civilizations is a great endeavor, Bahm believes that the computer age will provide “a new potential for handling complexities.” (Bahm, Comparative Philosophy, 40).
[41] Ibid., 6.
[42] Ibid., 25-43.
[43] Ibid., 41.
[44] Ibid., 22.
[45] Archie J. Bahm, “World Philosophy Methodology for Considering World Philosophy,” Methodology and Science 26, no. 4 (1993): 191-194.
[46] Ibid., 192.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid., 192-194.
[49] Ibid., 194.
[50] Ibid., 191.
[51] Stepukonis, 66.
[52] Stepukonis, 67.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Bahm, Comparative Philosophy, 22.
[56] Bahm, states that “even one who has achieved considerable success in comprehending and appreciating other philosophies still makes his comparative judgments in terms of [one’s own] view, albeit a much broader view, which he now holds.” (Ibid., 27.) Chung-Ying Cheng and Bunnin agree: “understanding the position of the other must be from one’s own standpoint, although the place that one stands can be altered.” Chung-Ying Cheng and Nicholas Bunnin, Contemporary Chinese Philosophy (Malden
[57] Neo-Confucians are those philosophers who integrate various other Chinese concepts such as Daoism, Buddhism, Marxism, Legalism, etc., into Confucian foundations. For a brief introduction of the third generation Neo-Confucian movement, refer to Marian Galik’s article, “Quo Vadis Philosophia?: Musings About the Necessity of Sino-Western Dialogue,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 31, no. 1 (2004). For an extensive look into the background of Neo-Confucianism and its contemporary developments, refer to Chung-Ying Cheng and Nicholas Bunnin, Contemporary Chinese Philosophy. There is a historical distinction between “New Neo-Confucians” and “Neo-Confucians.” Where the “New Neo-Confucians” are the third wave of Neo-Confucians—the contemporary movement of Neo-Confucianism, the Neo-Confucians date back to the ninth century (C.E.). The Neo-Confucians synthesized Daoist and Buddhist principles into Confucian philosophy to develop their style of philosophy. The New Neo-Confucians have been largely influenced by Amero-European philosophical traditions which are being synthesized into the philosophy.
[58] Robert C. Neville states in the Forward of Wei-ming Tu’s, Confucian Thought: Self-hood as Creative Transformation that this movement is “one of the most exciting and creative philosophical projects of our time: the evocation of a world philosophy for the twentieth century from Confucian roots.” (Albany: State University of New York, 1985), 5. Quoted by Galik, 68.
[59] Cheng and Bunnin, 375.
[60] Ibid., 402.
[61] Ibid., 404.
[62] Galik, 76.
[63] The Dalai Lama, The Universe in a Single Atom: The Convergence of Science and Spirituality, (New York : Morgan Road Books, 2005); B. Alan Wallace, Buddhism & Science: Breaking New Ground, (New York : Columbia University Press, 2003); and Choosing Reality: A Buddhist View of Physics and the Mind, (Ithaca Gentle Bridges Pannipitiya , Sri Lanka : Stamford Lake
[64] The Dalai Lama, 9-11.
[65] Wallace, Choosing Reality, 205.
[66] Ibid., 205.
[67] Ibid., 27.
[68] For an in-depth explanation of upāya, see: Wallace, Choosing Reality; The Dalai Lama, The Universe in a Single Atom; Sandra A. Wawrytko, “Language and Logic in the Lotus Sūtra: A Hermeneutical Exploration of Philosophical Underpinnings” in Bibliography; Nikkyo Niwano, Buddhism for Today: A Modern Interpretation of the Threefold Lotus Sutra; and Sandra A. Wawrytko “Holding up the Mirror to Buddha-nature: Discerning the Ghee in the Lotus Sūtra;” and Michael Pye, Skilful Means: A Concept in Mahayana Buddhism. There are vast amounts of references available on the topic of upāya.
[69] Stepukonis, 69.
[70] Stepukonis, 64.
[71] Charles A. Moore, “An Attempt at World Philosophical Synthesis,” in Essays in East-West Philosophy 13 (1951), as quoted from Stepukonis, 68.
[72] Ibid., 69.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Ashok Gangadean, “Logos of Dao: The Primal Logic of Translatability,” Asian Philosophy 12, no. 3 (2002): 215-216. Gangadean states, “It becomes clear that the legitimate concern to cultivate genuine multiplicity and diversity of perspectives can only be achieved by advancing beyond egocentric ‘rationality’ and expanding into the global rational space where multiple perspectives can truly breathe and flourish.”
[77] Ashok Gangadean, “Comparative Ontology: Relative and Absolute Truth,” Philosophy East & West 30, no. 4 (1980): 473.
[78] Ibid., 465.
[79] Ibid.
[80] Ibid., 467-473.
[81] Ibid, 474.
[82] Ashok Gangadean, “Spiritual Transformation as the Awakening of Global Consciousness: A Dimensional Shift in the Technology of Mind,” Zygon 41, no. 2 (2006): 386.
[83] Ibid., 384.
[84] Ibid. By “minding,” I use a notion similar to Gangadean’s that refers to the manner or way that our mind comports itself in relation to the self and the world. Minding is an activity, “verbing.” I have developed this notion through my many years of Daoism and Mahāyāna Buddhism study. Though Derrida played no part in the development of this notion, his method of deconstruction adds to the methodology that seems to be the most beneficial in inciting such a mental activity. The thesis will utilize both “mind” to connote the customary use of the term (as some thing) and minding to connote an activity of the mind. However, there is a feature of minding that needs to be stressed. Although in certain areas of my thesis, “mind” expresses the thing that does the minding, this is merely a practical way of expressing the notion. Ultimately, if there is minding, there is no mind that is doing the minding. I attempted to refrain from using the term “thinking” because it assumes that there is some thing (the mind, the brain, the soul) doing the thinking. Minding is a state where distinctions such as signified and signifier have been transcended. The notions of unthinking and spontaneity found in Daoism and Buddhism parallel my notion.
[85] By “transcendental shift,” Gangadean is referring to the shift from dealing with two ontologically distinct perspectives of reality to a perspective that transcends the dichotomy.
[86] Gangadean, “Comparative Ontology,” 477.
[87] Gangadean, “Spiritual Transformation,” 384-385.
[88] Ibid., 385.
[89] Ibid., 389-391.
[90] Gangadean’s terms of ego-centric and holistic ways of viewing the world can be interpreted to connote the Budhhist two-fold truth of conventional and ultimate ways of looking into the world. If this interpretation is granted, then the following claim will have adequate grounds for justification.
[91] “Samsāra” and “Nirvāna” are Buddhist terms referring to the two types of existence. Living in the cyclic existence of “samsāra” means that one is attached to the mundane activities of the world that makes the ego’s relation to things of the world as the most significant. This type of existence is believed to only bring suffering. Living in “Nirvānic” existence means that your ego is not connected to the things in the world and your mind transcends the tendency to attach to things in the world as having a fixed meaning. This type of existence is believed to liberate you from suffering.
[92] Nāgārjuna, The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, trans. Jay L. Garfield (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 331.
[93] Ibid., 334. A brief support to this claim can be found in the essay by Glen T. Martin, “Deconstruction and Breakthrough in Nietzsche and Nagarjuna,” Nietzsche and Asian Thought ed. Graham Parkes, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991): 91-111.
[94] Gangadean, “Spiritual Transformation,” 389.
[95] Laozi, Daodejing, chapter sixteen. Many interpreters use similar terminology; see Fu and Wawrytko’s, Wing-tsit Chan’s, D.C. Lau’s, and Arthur Waley’s versions.
[96] University of Hawaii at Mānoa, Uehiro CrossCurrents Comparative Philosophy Conference: Crisis and Opportunity, March 19 and 20, 2008, Center for Korean Studies, University of Hawaii
[97] Jeremy Henkel presented his on-going work for his dissertation. Both Henkel and Lopresti prepared a joint presentation, “Thoughts on Comparative Philosophy,” delivered at the Uehiro CrossCurrents Comparative Philosophy Conference, University of Hawaii
[98] University of Hawaii
[99] University of Hawaii
[100] Alan Fox, “Self-Reflection in the Sanlun Tradition: Mādhyamika as the ‘Deconstructive Conscience’ of Buddhism,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 19 (1992); Mark Berkson, “Language: Guest of Reality—Zhuangzi and Derrida on Language, Reality, and Skillfulness,” Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi, ed. Paul Kjellberg and Philip J. Ivanhoe (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996); Bimal Krishna Matilal, “Is Prasanga a Form of Deconstruction?,” Journal of Indian Philosophy 20 (1992); Ian W. Mabbett, “Nagarjuna and Deconstruction,” Philosophy East & West 45, no. 2 (1995); Jie-Wei Cheng, “Deconstruction, Yin-Yang, and Negative Theology,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 22 (1995); Zongqi Cai, “Derrida and Seng-Zhao: Linguistic and Philosophical Deconstructions,” Philosophy East & West 43, no. 3 (1993); Nathan Katz, “Prasańga and Deconstruction: Tibetan Hermeneutics and the Yāna Controversy,” Philosophy East & West 34, no. 2 (1984); Roger Jackson, “Matching Concepts: Deconstructive and Foundationalist Tendencies in Buddhist Thought,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion LVII, no. 3 (1989); David R. Loy, “Language Against its Own Mystifications: Deconstruction in Nāgārjuna and Dōgen,” Philosophy East & West 49, no. 3 (1999); Youru Wang, “Philosophy of Change, and the Deconstruction of Self in the Zhuangzi,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 27, no. 3 (2000); Robert E. Allinson, “On Chuang Tzu as Deconstructionist with a Difference,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 30, no. 3&4 (2003).
[101] Jean J. Derrida, “Letter to a Japanese Friend,” Derrida and Différance, ed. Wood & Bernasconi (Warwick: Parousia Press, 1985): 1.
[102] Ibid., 2.
[103] Ibid., 3.
[104] Ibid., 4.
[105] Ibid.
[106] Ibid., 5.
[107] Ibid.
[108] Ibid.
[109] Ibid., 4.
[110] Barbara Johnson, tr. Jacques Derrida’s Dissemination, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), ix.
[111] Derrida, “Letter,” 3.
[112] Typing the word “deconstruction” in the Philosopher’s Index database results in 1545 articles on the topic (April 2008). Deconstruction is not only a philosophy-specific topic. Deconstructive theory has expanded to politics, social sciences and the liberal arts, especially literary theory. Typing the word in Humanities International Index, (Whitston Publishing) a comprehensive database that provides cover-to-cover indexing and abstracting for more than 2,000 titles and contains more than 2 million records of journals, books and other important reference sources in the humanities, resulted in more than 1600 articles on the topic (April 2008).
[113] Berkson, 98.
[114] Ibid., 99.
[115] Bimal Krishna Matilal, “Is Prasanga a Form of Deconstruction?,” Journal of Indian Philosophy 20 (1992), 346.
[116] Ibid., 346.
[117] By “text,” I am referring to all that can be part of a text, including but is not limited to: a word, a concept, a notion, a theory and a system or structure of thought. When used in this sense, “text” will be italicized. “Logos” or “logocentrism” assumes that a transcendental meaning is contained within text, “that there is a ‘presence’ beyond the words, that words can get to something ‘real’ beyond the text, that there is an ultimate ‘transcendental signified’ that can form the foundation of language system.” Berkson, 100.
[118] Matilal, 346.
[119] Mabbett, 204.
[120] Ibid., 206.
[121] Ibid., 210.
[122] Ibid., 212.
[123] Ibid.
[124] Jie-Wei Cheng, 277.
[125] Johnson, xiv.
[126] The word “différance,” coined by Derrida, is a French neologism that plays with various connotations of the words “different” (meaning that a word’s meaning is determined by how it differs from other words—the relationship between signifier and signified) and “defer” (meaning that a complete meaning of a word will always be postponed due to their referents to other words. The meaning of the word in itself therefore is non-existent). For the original account of the meaning of différance, refer to Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena and other essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs, trans. David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973); "Différance," Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago & London: Chicago University Press, 1982); and Positions, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1971).
[127] Cai, 397.
[128] Katz, 187.
[129] Ibid.
[130] Roger Jackson, "Matching Concepts: Deconstructive and Foundationalist Tendencies in Buddhist Thought," Journal of the American Academy
[131] Cai, 389.
[132] Ibid., 390.
[133] Ibid.
[134] Ibid. For a more detailed look into this notion, please refer to Derrida “Différance.”
[135] Cai, 390.
[136] Ibid., 391.
[137] Ibid., 391.
[138] Ibid., 394.
[139] Martin, 104.
[140] Ibid., 100.
[141] Mabbett, 205.
[142] Ibid., 206.
[143] Ibid., 208.
[144] Ibid., 210.
[145] Ibid., 211.
[146] Ibid., 213.
[147] Ibid., 215.
[148] Ibid., 216.
[149] Ibid., 205.
[150] Martin, 104.
[151] Ibid., 108.
[152] Matilal, 345.
[153] This methodology has addressed major philosophical topics such as the discussion of self/no-self (ātman/anātman). The Buddhist principle of no-self was derived by the deconstructive process. For more information on the principle of no-self, see Rupert Gethin, Foundations of Buddhism, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) or Steve Collins, Selfless Persons: Imagery and Thought in Theravada Buddhism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
[154] Ibid., 358.
[155] Ibid., 356.
[156] Loy, 245.
[157] Cai, 393.
[158] Ibid., 400. Although Cai denies that interpreters and critics of Derrida’s deconstruction are “divided” when attributing anything positive to him, he nevertheless claims that Derrida does not provide an account of transcendence, which I disagree with. In the last part of this section when I deal with the issue of method, I will claim that although Derrida believes the “second affirmation” mentioned above is the affirmation of the state of deconstruction, there is creative hermeneutical room to see, with the additional expanded version of deconstruction, a positive transformative quality in Derrida’s deconstruction.
[159] Fox, 5. The above interpretation of poxie xianzheng has been developed by Fox. An alternative interpretation could be “smashing the deviant and manifesting the orthodox.” Though the first part of the statement clearly has “deconstructive” elements, the second part needs further clarification that Fox develops in his article. I would like to thank Dr. Julius Tsai for his translation of insights on this phrase.
[160] Ibid.
[161] Ibid., 14.
[162] Ibid., 15.
[163] Katz., 190.
[164] Ibid., 196. Katz states, “Since claims have no sui generic authority but need a reduction to their psychological matrices for analysis, the interpretation of claims, and especially of hermeneutical problems, presupposes a jump to the levels of the mind of the practitioner for successful Buddhist exegesis and interpretation,” (198).
[165] “Hīnayāna” is a pejorative term used by Mahāyāna Buddhism to denote the older schools of Buddhism that hold to strict reading and recitation of texts and practices as the only path to enlightenment. There is really no particular school that promotes “Hīnayāna” attributes.
[166] Katz, 199.
[167] Thich Nhat Hanh says that the Lotus Sūtra is known as “King of Sutras.” For an in-depth explanation of how the Lotus Sūtra reflects the various sects of Buddhism, see Thich Nhat Hanh’s first chapter, “The Wide Embrace of the Lotus Sūtra.” Thich Nhat Hanh, Opening the Heart of the Cosmos: Insights on the Lotus Sutra (Berkeley
[168] By “image-forming literature,” I am referring to literature that elicits illustrations or pictures in our minds to help us experience a certain sense of reality. It is distinct from conceptual or theoretical literature, which provides an abstract idea that requires complex and exact explanation. Image-forming invites readers to participate in the illustration by painting a picture based on their own sense of reality. This makes image-forming literature flexible, subjective, and directly experienced. Examples of image-forming literature are metaphors, poetry, myth, etc.
[169] For an adequate presentation of the usage of upāya in the Lotus Sūtra, refer to Pye. Pye ultimately asserts that upāya is the ontological being of reality that the Buddha proclaims which I call into question. From the above explorations and my study of the Lotus Sūtra, there is an inherent avoidance of such a stance by the Buddha, including the claim that upāya has transcendental or ontological significance. Although I challenge Pye’s ultimate claim, his presentation of the importance of upāya in the Lotus Sūtra is valuable.
[170] Loy, 250.
[171] Ibid., 258.
[172] Ibid., 252. For the entire account of how Loy approaches the deconstructive method, see pages 252-255.
[173] Ibid., 256.
[174] The I Ching or Book of Changes, trans. Richard Wilhelm (German) and Cary
[175] Kuang-ming Wu, The Butterfly as Companion: Meditations on the First Three Chapters of the Chuang Tzu, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 23.
[176] Sometimes the Daodejing is also called the Laozi, after its author—like the Zhaungzi. I will use both the Daodejing and the Laozi interchangeably. Italics refer to the book. Please note, both Laozi’s and Zhuangzi’s name has been spelled in various forms, including Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu due to the different transliterations. In my case, I will use Pinyin (the official Chinese pronunciation format). Daoism is also considered a major religious movement in the history of China
[177] Some chapters include but are not limited to 1, 5, 14, 42, and 56.
[178] The translation is by Charles Wei-Hsun Fu and Sandra A. Wawrytko included in Sandra A. Wawrytko, Chinese Philosophy in Cultural Context (San Diego: Montezuma Publishing, 2006 ).
[179] Though more often interpreted as a cosmology of emanation, my interpretation of Ch. 42 attempts to avoid to determine or “name” Dao which seems more consistent to the first chapter of the Laozi than an actual cosmological account of Dao.
[180] Dao De Jing, Fu and Wawrytko.
[181] Ibid.
[182] It would be beyond the scope of the thesis to address this issue, though one can research any database or library to find an article or book on Laozi and Daoism that has the phrases somewhere in its abstract, “Daoism is,” “Laozi’s philosophy is,” etc., which entirely miss the point.
[183] Wu, 27.
[184] Ibid., 79.
[185] Chuang Tzu, Chuang Tzu: Basic Writings, trans. Burton
[186] Wu, 13.
[187] Wang, 355.
[188] Cheng, 284.
[189] Lao Tzu Tao Te Ching, trans. D.C. Lau, chapter sixteen.
[190] Wu, The Butterfly as Companion, 103.
[191] Chuang Tzu, 66. I cannot help but see a parallel between this “Affirmation” Nietzsche’s notion of Amor Fati.
[192] Allinson, 496.
[193] Lisa Raphals, “On Hui Shi,” Wandering at Ease in the Zhuangzi, ed. Roger T. Ames, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 156.
[194] Charles Wei-hsun Fu, “The Trans-Onto-Theo-Logical Foundations of Language in Heidegger and Taoism,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 5, (1978): 301-333.
[195] Ibid., 321.
[196] Ibid., 324.
[197] Interesting comparison can be made between Heidegger’s tautology and Derrida’s statement that “Deconstruction deconstructs.”
[198] Ibid., 328.
[199] The term “soteriological,” which involves the goal of salvation, is not a term I champion whole heartedly. I prefer a notion that aims at liberation instead of salvation.
[200] Dōgen was trained in China
[201] Wawrytko, “Language and Logic,” 64.
[202] Charles Wei-hsun Fu, “Creative Hermeneutics: Taoist Metaphysics and Heidegger,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 3 (1976): 118. For further explanation, you can refer to Sandra A. Wawrytko, “Language and Logic in the Lotus Sutra.”
[203] Mabbett, 206.
[204] Katz, 187.
[205] Wawrytko, “Language and Logic,” 65.
[206] Fox, 2.
[207] Cai, 394.
[208] Cheng, 283.
[209] Berkson, 113.
[210] Katz, 200.
[211] Matilal, 347.
[212] Mabbett, 207.
[213] Loy, 257.
[214] Derrida, “Letter,” 4.
[215] Mabbett, 208.
[216] Wawrytko, “Language and Logic,” 65.
[217] Berkson, 122.
[218] Wawrytko, “Language and Logic,” 66.
[219] In another paper, I claim that a similar situation occurred with Nietzsche: “Nagarjuna and Nietzsche:Attempting to Transform the Perspective on Life.” Fall 2006, San Diego State University Philosophy Department, prepared for a course on Nietzsche taught by Deborah Chaffin.
[220] Plato, Phaedrus, trans. Alexander Nehamas & Paul Woodruff, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995), 229e-230a.
[221] Robert E. Cushman, Therapeia: Plato’s Conception of Philosophy, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1958), xxi.
[222] Ibid., 5.
[223] Ibid., 58.
[224] Jacob Needleman, The Heart of Philosophy, (New York: Knopf, 1982), 29.
[225] Laszlo Versenyi, Socratic Humanism, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), 79.
[226] I use the following standard abbreviations throughout: E (-thica), p(-roposition), cor(-ollary), dem(-onstration), schol(-ium). English translations are from Spinoza, Ethics, trans. G.H.R. Parkinson, (Oxford
[227] E1p28schol.
[228] E1p31dem. Sandra A. Wawrytko clarifies that Spinoza is connoting ‘intellect’ to be only discursive reasoning. Absolute thought or minding, then, must be referring to the higher mode of thought as intuition. Sandra A. Wawrytko, Undercurrent of ‘Feminine’ Philosophy in Eastern and Western Thought, (Washington D.C.: University Press of America, 1976), 174.
[229] E1p30.
[230] E2p44cor2.
[231] E3p3.
[232] E4p18schol.
[233] E4p28.
[234] Introduction of these levels of knowledge are mentioned in E2p40schol2.
[235] E5p32cor.
[236] Charles Wei-hsun Fu. “Lao Tzu’s Conception of Tao,” Inquiry 16 (1973): 390.
[237] Ibid., 390. Fu used The Chief Works of Benedictus de Spinoza, Vol. II (New York: Dover Publications, 1955), 51 as his source.
[238] For an overview of this two-fold noumenon account, refer to Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983).
[239] Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense—Revised and Enlarged Edition (New Haven
[240] The term “abstraction” is used frequently by Kant to describe a process of removing specific characteristics of appearances to get to the rudimentary formal structures. Some examples where he uses the term “abstraction” can be found in Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason Unabridged Edition, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1929), 18 (Bix), 78 (B53/A36), 106 (B95/A70). “Abstraction” is italicized to point out the special usage of this term.
[241] Martin, 91.
[242] Karen L. Carr and Philip J. Ivanhoe, The Sense of Antirationalism: The Religious Thought of Zhuangzi and Kiergegaard, (New York
[243] Ibid., 249.
[244] For example, Krishnamurti states, “It is attention that allows silence to come upon the mind, which is the opening of the door to creation.” J. Krishnamurti, Total Freedom, (San Francisco: Harper, 1996), 102. Fu’s examination of Daoistic language also reaches a state where “nothing can be said.” Fu, “The Trans-Onto-Theo-Logical,” 328.
[245] Bahm, Comparative Philosophy, 13.
[246] Galik, 77.
[247] Ibid., 78.
[248] Bahm, 191.
[249] Richard Schmitt, Martin Heidegger on Being Human: An Introduction to Sein und Zeit, (New York: Random House, 1969), 122.
[250] Haig Khatchadourian, “Philosophy and the Future,” Metaphilosophy 23, no. 1 & 2 (1992): 27.
[251] Solomon, 102.
[252] Ibid., 103.
[253] Wu. The term is used throughout the book.
[254] Krishnamurti, 102.
[255] Galik, 78.
[256] Khatchadourian, 32.
[257] Stuart Holroyd, Krishnamurti: The Man, The Mystery & The Message, (Rockport: Element Inc., 1991), 153.
[258] For an expanded presentation of Zhuangzi’s butterfly notion, refer to Wu.
[259] Wang, 351.
[260] Fox, 9.
[261] Katz, 196.
[262] Martin, 105.
[263] Watson, 302.
[264] Krishnamurti, 89.
[265] Krishnamurti, 181.
[266] Berkson, 103.
[267] Wu, 27.
[268] Holroyd, 78.
[269] Krishnamurti, 65.
[270] Krishnamurti, 11.
